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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters on topics in political economy. In the first chapter, using hand-
collected data from collective bargaining agreements for state-level public sector unions, I develop and
calibrate a stochastic bargaining model as in Merlo and Wilson (1995) and investigate the effects of political
and economic variables on wages, pensions, and delay in reaching agreement. In the model, a governor and a
union bargain over a wage and pension outcome. The economic state, as measured by the unemployment rate,
evolves stochastically and affects the propensity of the governor and union to reach agreement in any given
period. Furthermore, political variables, including party of the governor, partisanship of the district, and
incumbency, affect the relative payoffs and therefore the wage, pension, and time to agreement. I find that
negotiated wage and pension growth is higher under Democratic governors, while increases in the
unemployment rate at the beginning of bargaining have a negative impact on compensation levels, the
magnitude of which varies by party and time before the next election.
In the second chapter, which is co-authored with Ekim Cem Muyan, I develop a model of campaign strategies,
namely the choice to campaign negatively or positively. In particular, I construct a model of political
campaigns, based off of Skaperdas and Grofman (1995), in which candidates allocate their budget between
positive and negative campaigning. Elections vary according to politician- and district-specific characteristics,
as well as the unobservable (to the econometrician) measure of voter types. I calibrate the model to match
stylized facts on campaign tone that we document using a wide array of sources, including data on advertising
tone from Wisconsin Advertising Project, campaign contributions from the Database on Ideology, Money in
Politics, and Elections, and election results. The calibrated model implies that, overall, campaign spending is
not particularly effective at increasing votes -- a 10% increase in the average candidate's budget, corresponding
to about $240,000, raises his or her expected vote share by about 0.4 percentage points. The model also
implies that negativity is marginally more useful for candidates who are trailing than those leading, though not
by a wide margin.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
Devin Reilly
Holger Sieg
This dissertation consists of two chapters on topics in political economy. In the first chapter,
using hand-collected data from collective bargaining agreements for state-level public sector
unions, I develop and calibrate a stochastic bargaining model as in Merlo and Wilson (1995)
and investigate the effects of political and economic variables on wages, pensions, and delay
in reaching agreement. In the model, a governor and a union bargain over a wage and
pension outcome. The economic state, as measured by the unemployment rate, evolves
stochastically and affects the propensity of the governor and union to reach agreement
in any given period. Furthermore, political variables, including party of the governor,
partisanship of the district, and incumbency, affect the relative payoffs and therefore the
wage, pension, and time to agreement. I find that negotiated wage and pension growth
is higher under Democratic governors, while increases in the unemployment rate at the
beginning of bargaining have a negative impact on compensation levels, the magnitude of
which varies by party and time before the next election.
In the second chapter, which is co-authored with Ekim Cem Muyan, I develop a model
of campaign strategies, namely the choice to campaign negatively or positively. In par-
ticular, I construct a model of political campaigns, based off of Skaperdas and Grofman
(1995), in which candidates allocate their budget between positive and negative campaign-
ing. Elections vary according to politician- and district-specific characteristics, as well as
the unobservable (to the econometrician) measure of voter types. I calibrate the model to
match stylized facts on campaign tone that we document using a wide array of sources,
iv
including data on advertising tone from Wisconsin Advertising Project, campaign contribu-
tions from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections, and election results.
The calibrated model implies that, overall, campaign spending is not particularly effective
at increasing votes – a 10% increase in the average candidate’s budget, corresponding to
about $240,000, raises his or her expected vote share by about 0.4 percentage points. The
model also implies that negativity is marginally more useful for candidates who are trailing
than those leading, though not by a wide margin.
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Chapter 1 : The Political Economy
of Public Sector Union
Bargaining
1.1 Introduction
In the United States, state and local governments spent about $2.4 trillion in 2014, which
constituted 13.7% of GDP. Employee compensation accounted for over half of this, totaling
over $1.3 trillion.1 Furthermore, the level, growth, and structure of public sector compen-
sation are all subject to factors distinct from private sector labor markets.2 The scale of
public sector compensation alone suggests that understanding its determinants is impor-
tant. Moreover, the recent financial crisis has strained state budgets significantly, with
tax revenues declining about 12% in real terms in 2009 and only recently reaching their
pre-recession levels. Additionally, recent work suggests that state pension plans, which
cover over 22 million participants and hold over $2.4 trillion in assets, are significantly un-
derfunded and upcoming pension obligations pose concerns for state finances in the near
1See U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Tables 3.3 and 6.2D.
2Certainly since there is mobility between public and private sector markets, the pressures are not com-
pletely distinct. However, several studies, including for instance Bewerunge and Rosen (2013), have doc-
umented how the structure and levels of public sector compensation are different from the private sector
controlling for various worker observables. Additionally, Bagchi (2015) has documented a positive relation-
ship between election closeness and pension generosity for municipal workers in Pennsylvania, suggesting
further that political variables may play a role in determining public sector compensation.
1
future.3 Thus, the question of what determines public sector compensation has only become
more important in recent years.
While the topic of public sector compensation is not new, most previous work has focused
on either measuring the difference between public and private sector compensation, or on
the effect of union strength on either pensions or wages.4 However, relatively little is known
about the political factors that affect public sector compensation, especially in the context
of collective bargaining.5 Anecdotal evidence suggests that political factors may be im-
portant in determining bargaining outcomes. For instance, there is an increasing partisan
divide over public sector compensation, with Republican governors such as Scott Walker
and Chris Christie taking harder lines with unions than many Democratic governors.6 Fur-
thermore, the few papers that focus on politics and public sector union outcomes show that
political factors may be important. For instance, Sieg and Wang (2013) focus on mayoral
elections and find that union endorsements can affect election outcomes, and therefore that
such endorsements can be used to extract more union-friendly fiscal policies. Additionally,
Bagchi (2015) finds that election closeness is positively related to pension generosity using
data from municipalities in Pennsylvania, while Anzia and Moe (2015a) find differences in
pension expansions and reductions across political parties. Thus, further investigation of
the interaction of politics and public sector union bargaining outcomes is needed.
Using a novel dataset with information on collective bargaining agreements for state public
sector unions, this chapter investigates the effects of political and economic variables on
bargaining outcomes. In particular, I develop a stochastic bargaining model as in Merlo
and Wilson (1995) and Merlo (1997) in which a governor and a union bargain over a wage
and pension outcome. The economic state, as measured by the unemployment rate, evolves
stochastically and affects the propensity of the governor and union to reach agreement in any
3See, for instance, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009), (2011), and (2014).
4For pensions, see for instance Munnell and Quinby (2011a). For wages, see, for example, Freeman and
Han (2012) and Anzia and Moe (2015b).
5See Sieg and Wang (2013), Bagchi (2015), and Anzia and Moe (2015a) as exceptions, which I discuss
below.
6See New York Times Magazine, June 12, 2015, “Scott Walker and the Fate of the Union.”
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given period. Furthermore, political variables, including party of the governor, partisanship
of the district, and incumbency affect the relative payoffs and therefore the wage, pension,
and delay in reaching agreement.
In particular, each period the unemployment rate is realized and a proposer, either the
governor or the union, is randomly selected. The proposer makes a wage and pension offer
to the responder, who accepts or rejects. All else equal, the union prefers to receive larger
wages and pensions, while the governor prefers lower wages and pensions. The relative
costs to the governor from raising wages and pensions depend on the economic state and
his political party. Furthermore, both parties receive a flow benefit during bargaining. The
union’s benefit depends on the current wages and pension. The governor’s depends on
whether or not the parties have reached agreement, with the level of benefits depending
on political party and economic state. For instance, Democrats may have relatively high
benefits from reaching agreement especially in good economic states, whereas Republicans
on net may be relatively better off “bargaining tough” with unions, especially when the
unemployment rate is high. Finally, if the sides reach the nearest election date without
agreement, both sides may face a disagreement cost.
In some states and dates, parties may mutually benefit from postponing agreement until
a better state arises as raising compensation when the unemployment rate is high may
be particularly costly. The propensity to delay, as well as the realized wage and pension
agreements, depend on the relative values of flow benefits, costs and benefits of raising com-
pensation, and terminal disagreement costs. Thus, model outcomes will depend on political
party, proximity to the next election, and economic state, among other variables.
The logic of the model is as follows. Politicians may be more reluctant to increase employee
compensation in bad economic times. This could be due in part to voter pressure and in part
due to budgetary effects. Thus, if bargaining begins in a bad economic state, politicians and
unions may both be willing to postpone reaching agreement until a later period in which
there is less political pressure. The framework of a stochastic bargaining model is known
3
to explain delay in reaching agreement, which is prevalent in the data, and can capture
these mechanisms, shedding light on several factors that determine public sector bargaining
outcomes.
I find that overall compensation growth is larger under Democrats and in better economic
states, as measured by the unemployment rate. In particular, I find that wage growth under
Democrats is approximately 0.43 percentage points larger than than under Republicans,
while pension growth is about 1.33 percentage points larger. Delay in reaching agreement
is also significantly lower under Democrats by approximately 1.45 months. Additionally,
the model implies that increases in the unemployment rate at the time bargaining begins
tend to decrease both wages and pensions. Simulations from the calibrated model show
that, for a representative bargaining spell, an approximately one percentage point decrease
in initial unemployment rate generates higher wage growth by about 0.53 percentage points
for Democrats or 0.44 percentage points for Republicans. Pension growth responds by
about 0.31 percentage points for Democrats and 0.06 percentage points for Republicans,
depending on the level of unemployment. Finally, as consistent with previous work, pension
growth is larger for bargaining spells that begin with more well-funded pension plans.
This chapter contributes to three main strands of the literature. First, the model is a
version of the general stochastic bargaining model developed in Merlo and Wilson (1995),
which can rationalize delay in bargaining settings. Most applications of the model, includ-
ing Merlo (1997) and Diaz-Moreno and Galdon-Sanchez (2005), assume transferable utility
and bargaining over a unidimensional, perfectly divisible object.7 In this chapter, however,
the governor and union have different, non-linear utilities over bargaining outcomes, which
are multi-dimensional wage-pension pairs. Non-transferable utility makes sense in this case
relative to other applications, since the union cares about the wage and pensions insofar as
they increase consumption, while the governor cares about wages and pensions primarily
through its effect on elections and the state budget. Thus, whereas in private union bar-
7See Diaz-Moreno and Galdon-Sanchez (2000) for a counterexample, which features non-transferable
utility. In particular, the though players have linear utility, the model allows for players to have different
discount factors.
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gaining the object is profits, which both sides may value more or less equally, in the public
sector the utilities of the two sides likely differ. This chapter is also, to my knowledge, the
first application of stochastic bargaining models to public-sector union bargaining.
Second, the chapter contributes to a wide literature on collective bargaining. Much of the
older literature on collective bargaining looks at the private sector and the prevalence of
strikes and holdouts. For example, Farber (1978), Hart (1989), and Kennan and Wilson
(1989) focus on strike, whereas Gu and Kuhn (1998) explain holdouts. These papers often
involve asymmetric information, either in regards to the cost of delay or firm profitabil-
ity. Here, the model features perfect and complete information, rationalizing delay via a
stochastic state that evolves over time. If the state is bad, it may make sense for sides
to postpone and reach agreement later. Asymmetric information may be less suitable in
explaining holdouts and delay in the public sector, since there is no “firm profitability”
involved, and since information is often publicly available to both sides unlike in the private
sector. Additionally, much of the more recent literature investigates the effect of union-
ization or collective bargaining laws on compensation in the public sector (see Falch and
Strom (2005), Munnell and Quinby (2011a), Feiveson (2015), and Anzia and Moe (2015b)
for instance). While this chapter does not directly compare compensation across different
collective bargaining regimes, it does more explicitly model the bargaining process, which
sheds light on how compensation is determined within states that allow bargaining.
Finally, this chapter contributes to the literature on the interaction between politics and
public sector unions and compensation. Sieg and Wang (2013), as previously discussed,
focuses on the effect of union endorsements on mayoral election outcomes, as well as how
endorsements can be used to extract concessions in the form of pro-union policy. Bagchi
(2015) analyzes municipalities in Pennsylvania and the effect of political factors on pension
funding, finding higher underfunding in politically competitive jurisdictions. It also provides
evidence that pension generosity is higher in more competitive municipalities. Finally,
Anzia and Moe (2015a) analyze pension expansions and restrictions and finds differences
between Republican and Democratic support for such changes. In contrast to these three,
5
this chapter focuses explicitly on the bargaining process between unions and governments.
Furthermore, I analyze the joint determination of wages, pensions, and bargaining delay,
whereas these papers look at either pensions or, in the case of Sieg and Wang (2013), total
payrolls.
Section 1.2 discuss some of the background and institutional details of public sector union
bargaining. Section 1.3 discusses the data used and some evidence on the relationship
between public sector union bargaining outcomes and political and economic variables.
Section 1.4 describes the model, while Section 1.5 discusses the calibration procedure and
fit. Section 1.6 further decomposes the model implications, and section 1.7 concludes the
main text of the chapter. Finally, section 1.8 provides the appendix.
1.2 Institutional Details
In this section, I briefly discuss some of the relevant institutional details, namely collective
bargaining and public sector unions. In the private sector, labor unions have diminished
in importance over the past several decades, with membership decreasing from 24.2% of
the workforce in 1973 to 6.6% in 2014. However, in the public sector, membership has
increased from 23.0% to 35.7% over the same period.8 The rate is even higher for public
safety workers. The unionization rate among police officers is 60%, and among firefighters
it is 67%.9 Furthermore, almost 40% of all public employees are covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. Thus, collective bargaining plays an important role in determining
compensation and other terms of employment in the public sector.
Collective bargaining and wage negotiation is allowed in 40 states for general employees,
with some slight differences for teachers or public safety employees.10 However, the vast
majority of states do not allow employees to strike. For public safety employees, only two
8See Hirsch and Macpherson (2014).
9See Sanes and Schmitt (2014).
10See Sanes and Schmitt (2014).
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states – Hawaii and Ohio – allow striking, while for general employees only 10 do. Even in
states in which striking is allowed, it is incredibly rare, particularly at the state level.11
In collective bargaining in the public sector, the union and the state representative bargain
over various terms of employment, often including wages, pension benefits, health benefits,
employment, and many others. The agreements can be up to 200 pages or more, though
many of these can be filled with minor details and legalese. The union represents a certain
set of employees within the public sector and there are multiple public unions within each
state, often with public safety employees (i.e. police and firefighters), teachers, and other
employees grouped together. Within a given union, the specified lengths of the contracts
are typically the same over time. For instance, for most unions in New Jersey, contracts
are four years long and there is very little deviation from this. Thus, contract length can
be seen as exogenous.
Each union at any given point in time will be under a particular contract. Prior to its
expiration, the collective bargaining process begins. If a new contract is not agreed upon
prior to the expiration date of the old contract, then the old contract remains in place
until agreement is reached. As I discuss in section 1.3, while many bargaining spells reach
agreement prior to expiration date, the majority do not. Once the agreement is reached,
the new contract begins and bargaining stops until close to the following expiration date.
Note that the governor of the state is required to sign all agreements, and thus is a party
to all negotiations. Thus, in the model, I focus only on the governor on the side of the
state.12
Finally, an important point regarding compensation is the structure of pension plans. Pen-
sion in the private sector are generally defined-contribution. In such plans, the agreements
between workers and firms specify an amount that the firm will contribute to a retirement
fund. Then, the worker can choose how to allocate the funds in a portfolio and is entitled
11See, for example, Governing Magazine, October 10, 2012, “Why Public-Sector Strikes Are So Rare.”
12In some states, the legislature has a vote over contracts, and in many states they vote on pension changes.
However, for tractability, and because the governor has veto power and thus likely exerts a disproportionate
amount of power on the negotiations, I focus exclusively on the governor.
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to the principal and returns, but is not guaranteed any set amount in retirement – hence
defined-contribution. In the public sector, the majority of plans are defined-benefit.13 In
these plans, a formula is specified that guarantees a set benefit in retirement as a function of
worker-specific variables, tenure and average salary, and plan-specific variables. I describe
more precisely the formulation of these plans in the next section. Public workers and the
government typically contribute a percentage of salary to a pension fund that invests as
it sees prudent.14 However, unlike defined-contribution plans, in defined-benefit plans the
worker is entitled to whatever the specified benefit is, not to the returns of the pension fund.
Since plans can potentially be underfunded and benefits do not need to be paid out until
the future when a worker retires, there may be incentives for the government to provide
generous pensions, consistent with previous research.15
1.3 Data
The primary sources of data are state-level collective bargaining (CB) agreements for var-
ious years and bargaining units. From each contract, I hand-collect relevant information
including salary increases, agreement date, coverage dates, and other terms of employment.
Some contracts also contain data on pension plans, though other times this is only available
through state websites. For each state, contract availability does vary, although overall
there is a bias towards more recent agreements.
For empirical implementation, the unit of analysis is a bargaining spell, which begins at the
contract begin date and ends at either: (i) the date of agreement, or (ii) the date of the
subsequent gubernatorial election, whichever is earlier. Those that do not reach agreement
by the election are referred to as “ending in disagreement.” The final sample contains 422
13Both in the aggregate and among the states in my sample, defined-benefit plans are the dominant form
of pensions.
14The funding of plans by the government has historically been too low relative to what many experts
believe is appropriate. See Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009), among many others, for a discussion on pension
accounting and funding.
15See, for instance, Bagchi (2015).
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bargaining spells. Note that if an observation ends in disagreement, there will be another
observation for the same contract starting after the election and ending in agreement.16 In
the final sample, 39 bargaining spells end in disagreement, while in 383 spells the parties
reach agreement. The final sample includes those spells remaining after I drop contracts
in which there was no indication of the agreement date or the wage change, or those with
begin dates earlier than 2000.
To supplement information from the CB contracts, I use pension data from the Public Plans
Database, which includes data on funding levels for 107 state pension funds (which account
for 90% of all state government pension assets and members) from 2001 to 2013. I also
use state-level data on unionization rates,17 demographic data from the Census and CPS,
monthly unemployment rates from FRED, and electoral and political data. The electoral
and political variables include gubernatorial party indicators, candidates, election outcomes,
and the Cook Partisan Voting Index (CPVI), which is a measure of the partisanship of each
state.18
1.3.1 Wages and Delay Times
Each CB agreement contains information on wage increases for covered employees. Gen-
erally, wage increases are the same for all workers. As an example, a contract covering a
given union for a fixed time period specifies a nominal percent salary increase at particular
months. Figure 1 shows an excerpt from the contract of the judiciary support staff unit in
New Jersey for 2004-2008.
Figure 2 presents the distribution of gross average real wage growth in the sample.19 These
16Technically such a spell could again end in disagreement again at the following election date (which
would be four years away). However, none of the bargaining spells in the sample last this long.
17See Hirsch and Macpherson (2014).
18The CPVI is calculated as the average two-party vote share for the party that won the state in the
previous two presidential elections minus the national average for that party. For instance, in 2004 and
2008, the national average two-party vote share was 51.2% to 49.8% in favor of Democrats. In Iowa, in 2004
the Democratic two-party vote share was 49.7%, while in 2008 it was 54.8%. Then, the average Democratic
vote share over these two elections is 52.25%, making the CPVI Democrat+1.
19There are only 383 observations since, for the 39 bargaining spells ending in disagreement, there is no
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Figure 1
Example Salary Increases, NJ Judiciary Support Staff Union, 2004-2008
are gross real wage increases, so an observation of 1.02 indicates a net real wage increase of
about 2%. On average, real wages are essentially constant over the sample, with changes
ranging from about a 5% decline to a 4.65% increase.
Figure 2
Distribution of Real Average Gross Wage Increases, Conditional on
Agreement
The contracts also show that bargaining spells are often characterized by significant delays
in reaching agreement. Delay is defined as number of months between the end date of
the previous contract and the agreement date of the new contract.20 Figure 3 presents
agreed upon wage increase.
20Technically, since bargaining begins sometime before the old contract ends, the true “delay” is from
the negotiation begin date to agreement date. However, the date at which the negotiation begins is not
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the distribution of delay (in months). In the sample, average delay is approximately 6.91
months, while the maximum is 36 months. Note also the spike at 0 months, indicating that
the modal contract is agreed to at or before the end of the previous contract.
Figure 3
Distribution of Agreement Delay Times
While there is a mass of bargaining spells with no delay (23.7% of spells have a delay
of zero), most contracts have positive delay, implying that most contracts are finalized
after the contract begins. This is certainly costly to the union in the sense of foregone
wage increases, and is also likely costly to the politician. The median delay is only three
months, but the maximum delay is 36 months, or three years. The prevalence of delay in
public sector union bargaining in part motivates the decision to model the interaction as a
stochastic bargaining game, which can rationalize delay in equilibrium.21
observable for all bargaining spells. Therefore, I measure delay as the time between the beginning of the
contract until agreement. It is important to note that the begin date of the contract is also a logical date to
start given the modeling framework, as delay prior to the beginning of the contract is essentially costless.
21See, for instance, Merlo and Wilson (1995) and Merlo (1997).
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1.3.2 Pensions
Most public sector pensions are defined-benefit plans in which benefits are determined by
a set formula. This formula is the product of three variables, some plan-specific and some
employee-specific. The first is the retirement factor, which generally varies between 0.01 and
0.03. The second is the final average salary (FAS) of the worker. While this in part depends
on the worker-specific salary path, the number of years included in the FAS is plan-specific,
which I refer to as “FAS years.” Note that in general, FAS years is negatively related to
pension generosity, since most workers’ salaries are increasing over their tenure.22 The final
variable is number of years of service, which is purely worker-specific. The product of these
three variables will give the pre-tax monthly pension benefit for the worker. Furthermore,
each plan specifies a contribution rate for the employee, which is the amount of pre-tax
salary contributed by the employee during his working life. The contribution rate is often
related implicitly to the pension generosity in that, on average, more generous pensions
have higher contribution rates. However, there is no direct link as these are defined-benefit
plans. Thus, an increase in the contribution rate will, all else equal, decrease the effective
wage of the employee and not change the expected pension. Figures 4(a) to 4(c) show the
distributions of each pension parameter.
To summarize pension generosity from these parameters, I compute “replacement rates”
for each contract. In some contracts, pensions are not directly bargained over. For these
spells, I use any changes during the span of the contract as the measure of pensions. The
replacement rate is the after-tax pension income a worker takes home relative to the after-
tax and after-contribution final year of salary for a specified worker. To measure this, I
must assume some worker-specific characteristics. I consider an unmarried state public
safety worker with 30 years of tenure and a $50,000 pre-tax retirement salary.23 Figure
22Even beyond this, the FAS is usually specified to be the average of the, say, four highest years of salary,
not last working years. So, even if a worker’s salary declines as he nears retirement, the pension will usually
be tied to the peak salary over his or her working life.
23The fact that the worker is unmarried does not affect the pre-tax pension benefit, but may affect the
tax rate the worker is subject to. Appendix 1.8.3 describes the computation of pensions and tax rates in
greater detail.
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Figure 4
Distributions of Pension Plan Parameters
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4(d) shows the distribution of the estimated replacement rates. A replacement rate of one
indicates the take-home pay from the pension is equal to the take-home pay in the year
prior to retirement.
Many of the replacement rates in the sample tend to be larger than one, indicating that
the representative public worker would receive higher take-home income in retirement than
in working life. This is due in part to the fact that public sector employee pensions are
sometimes exempt from state taxes, while their wages are not. Furthermore, workers must
pay some of their pre-tax salary during working life in pension contributions, while they
contribute nothing in retirement. These data are suggestive of high public sector pensions
and backloading, in line with previous work. Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2011)
compute replacement rates for general state employees and also finds that workers with
tenure over 25 years often have replacement rates of over 100%.24
Finally, the degree of underfunding of pension obligations is significant and potentially
important in determining the growth of pensions for public sector workers. In particular,
each year an employee works, he accrues an earned benefit payable in retirement. The
government is often supposed to contribute funds to the pension plan as these benefits
accrue, but the degree to which this is done varies widely across states. Thus, the level of
pension plans funding, defined to be total assets over total accrued liabilities, varies, with
many state plans significantly underfunded. If current pension funding is too low, then there
may be weaker incentives for politicians to compensate workers via pensions, as it would
weaken the financial health of the pension plan and potentially necessitate higher taxes.
Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) indicate that underfunding of state-local pension plans was
about $1 trillion in 2008, using discount rates of 7% and 8% on future pension liabilities.
However, they argue that since future pension promises are almost universally protected
strongly by contract law or state constitutions, the appropriate discount rate is the risk-
24Certainly this is not the average pension benefit across all public sector workers, since most workers
will tend to have shorter tenures. However, given that the focus is on public sector bargaining, I focus on
workers with more tenure (and therefore larger pensions) since they will likely have more power within the
union.
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free rate. Using Treasury borrowing rates, aggregate underfunding is $3.76 trillion for the
largest 116 state pension funds. Figure 5 presents the distribution of funding ratios using
the pension plans’ assumed actuarial rates. All of these plans use discount rates over 7%,
implying that the funding statuses of these plans is arguably weaker than indicated.
Figure 5
Distribution of Stated Funding Ratios
1.3.3 Data Analysis
To better understand the data, and in particular the relationship between political vari-
ables and bargaining outcomes, Table 1 shows the sample means for delay, real average
wage changes, and real average pension changes, both in the aggregate and by party. The
data show significant differences in all three variables by party. First, Democrats have on
average significantly less delay, by about 1.5 months. Second, both real wage and real pen-
sion changes are significantly higher for Democrats. Real wage changes are approximately
0.4 percentage points larger for Democrats, while real pension changes are on average 1.3
percentage points larger. Note also that these differences are robust to state fixed effects.
Overall, these data are suggestive of the potential importance of political variables in af-
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fecting public sector bargaining outcomes.
Table 1
Sample Means, by party
All Dem. Rep. Diff
Delay (in months) 6.929 6.307 7.757 -1.450*
(0.400) (0.486) (0.670) (0.828)
Avg. Real Wage -1.833 -1.654 -2.080 0.427*
Change (in pp) (0.125) (0.168) (0.185) (0.250)
Avg. Real Pension -1.640 -1.081 -2.410 1.328***
Change (in pp) (0.225) (0.264) (0.384) (0.476)
Figure 6
Mean Wages by Delay
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Figure 6 documents the relationship between average wage changes and delay. In partic-
ular, the graphs show, for each realized level of delay, the average of all wage changes in
contracts with this delay. The top panel plots this for Democrats while the bottom plot
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if for Republicans, and the solid line is the data while the dashed is the fitted line. The
data show that, for both parties, longer delay is associated with smaller wage increases.
The fitted line for the Democrats indicates that a 10 month increase in delay is associated
with about 0.63 percentage point lower wage growth. For Republicans, such an increase in
delay is associated with about 0.16 percentage point lower wage growth. This relationship
between delay and wage growth is something the model will be able to capture.
1.4 Model
To gain additional insights into the determinants of public sector union bargaining outcomes,
I model the interactions between unions and governors in a stochastic bargaining framework
as in Merlo and Wilson (1995) and Merlo (1997). I assume there are two players, a governor
(g) and a public sector union (u). I abstract from the bargaining problem within the
government (e.g. between the executive and legislature, or within the legislature) and
within the union (i.e. the age conflict between young and old workers). I interchangeably
refer to the union as “employees” or “workers,” and to the governor as “politician.” The
two parties bargain over a contract that specifies the wage and pension levels for union
employees. A monthly wage-pension pair is denoted (w, p) ∈ R2+. I assume that until
agreement is reached, the previous agreement, denoted (w, p), remains in place. I do not
consider the ability of the union to strike, as in the sample period the presence of strikes is
extremely rare, and many states explicitly forbid it.25
Let S = {1, ..., S} denote the (finite) set of possible states of the world with typical element
s. Let σ denote a Markov process with transition probability pis,s′ = Pr(s
′|s) ≥ 0 denoting
the probability of moving from state s to state s′, with
∑
s′∈S pis,s′ = 1 for every s ∈ S.
Additionally, in each period, a proposer κ ∈ {g, u} is selected with probability Πκ such that
25Certainly the ability to strike may affect outcomes, even if striking is not observed in equilibrium, as
long as it is a credible threat. However, the paucity of strikes does perhaps suggest that it may not credible.
For this reason, and for tractability purposes, I abstract from this dimension of bargaining.
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Πg + Πu = 1. The proposal probability for each player is independent of the state s ∈ S.26
Finally, at the beginning of each period, shock γt ∈ R is realized that affects the utility of
the governor, as I will describe. This shock has CDF Hγ(γt; θ) with parameter θ, and is iid
over time and independent of the state and proposer processes.
For t = 0, ..., T , let σt ≡ (σ0, ..., σt) denote the t-period state history with realization
st = (s0, s1, ..., st). That is, s
t is the t + 1 length history up to period t, and st is the
realization of the state in period t. Here, T < ∞ is the bargaining deadline, and at T + 1
an election is held. Let κ˜t ≡ (κ˜0, ..., κ˜t) denote the history of proposers up to period t,
with generic realization κt ≡ (κ0, ..., κt) ∈ {g, u}t+1. Finally, let γ˜t ≡ (γ˜0, ...γ˜t) denote the
history of γ-shocks with generic realization γt ≡ (γ0, ..., γt) ∈ Rt+1. I assume the realized
state history is observed by both the players and the econometrician, while the proposer
and γ-shock histories are only observed the players. The wage-pension pair (w, p) is in
monthly terms, and each bargaining period is one month.
The bargaining protocol is as follows. At the beginning of period t, contract (w, p) is in
place and state st−1 is known. Then, state st is realized with probability pist−1,st , proposer
κt ∈ {g, u} is realized with probability Πκt , and shock γt ∈ R is realized according to its
CDF Hγ(γt; θ). I refer to the player who is not the proposer as the responder, and denote
him as −κt. Player κt offers a contract (w, p), and player −κt accepts or rejects. After
acceptance or rejection, flow payoffs are realized. If the offer is accepted, the flow utility
(and all future flow utilities) are evaluated at the new contract and the game ends. If
the offer is rejected, the current period flow utility is evaluated at the old contract (w, p)
and play advances one period. At time T + 1, a terminal payoff is realized, depending on
whether agreement had ever been reached and, if so, the agreed upon contract. I assume
that players are impatient with common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
Consider a bargaining spell with initial contract (w, p). First, I describe the union’s utility.
Each period, it receives a flow utility depending on what the current wage and pension are.
26This assumption is not necessary for any of the main results; there may be correlation between the state
and proposer.
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If agreement has not been reached prior to the end of the period, the flow utility for the
union is given by:
uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) =
(w(1− τw))1−σ
1− σ + η(X)
(
p(1− τp)
)1−σ
1− σ , (1)
where X is a vector of union-specific observables, τw is the average tax rate during working
life, τp is the average tax rate on pension income in retirement.
27 The parameter η(X) >
0 governs the relative value of pensions to wages, and may capture factors like the age
distribution of union workers.
If an agreement is reached, I denote the agreed upon wage-pension pair as (w∗, p∗). In
a period in which agreement is reached, as well as in periods thereafter, the flow utility
is:
uu(w
∗, p∗, X, τw, τp) =
(w∗(1− τw))1−σ
1− σ + η(X)
(p∗(1− τp))1−σ
1− σ (2)
The terminal utility if no agreement is reached by the end of time T is given by:
uNAu (w, p,X, τw, τp) = Υuu(w, p,X, τw, τp)− du(sT+1), (3)
where du(sT+1) is an exogenous cost to the union conditional on not reaching agreement
prior to the election that depends on the economic state. The parameter Υ governs the
relative value of terminal to the flow utility, and captures the notion that the contract will
last several periods after the terminal period. Thus, the weight Υ captures the persistence
of the contract beyond the end of bargaining.
Finally, the terminal utility if a new contract (w∗, p∗) is agreed upon before the end of
27Note that in principle, these tax rates depend on the wages and pensions of the worker due to progressive
taxation. However, I use the average tax rates paid by the representative worker for τw and τp and assume it
is a flat tax. Given the typical size in pension and wage changes, this local approximation is not quantitatively
significant.
19
period T is given by:
uAu (w
∗, p∗, X, τw, τp) = Υuu(w∗, p∗, X, τw, τp). (4)
That is, the terminal utilities are affine transformations of the flow utilities from the con-
tract.
Putting these components together, the discounted utility to the union from agreement
(w∗, p∗) in state s, at time t is:
Uu(w
∗, p∗, X, τw, τp) =
(
1− δT−t+1
1− δ + δ
T−t+1Υ
)
uu(w
∗, p∗, X, τw, τp)
Consider next the governor in the bargaining spell from political party D ∈ {dem, rep}. His
utility can be broken down into four components. First, he receives a flow utility while in
office throughout bargaining that depends on whether the old contract or the new contract
is in place, as well as party and state s. Let o(s,D) denote the flow utility when the old
contract is in place, and n(s,D) be the flow utility when the new contract is in place, both
of which depend on the state.
Second, in the period in which agreement occurs, there is a one-time cost that depends on
the state, the agreed upon contract (w∗, p∗), and the old contract. I assume a functional
form of:
− c1(s,D)(w∗ − w)− (c2(s,D)− cf2fun)(p∗ − p), (5)
with ci(s,D) ≥ 0 for all i, s, and D. Furthermore, cf2 ≥ 0, and fun is the funding level (i.e.
assets over liabilities) of the union’s pension fund. This expression captures the idea that as
pension funding increases, it may become relatively less costly for the governor to increase
pensions. This total cost is paid by the governor once the contract details are agreed upon
and revealed, regardless of when the next election is. Third, also in the period τ in which
agreement occurs, the governor receives utility γτ .
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Finally, the governor’s derives utility from the expected vote share at the election in period
T + 1. I assume there is a unit mass of voters in the governor’s state. Voter k is assumed
to vote for the current politician (or his party if he is term-limited) given contract (wˆ, pˆ) is
in place and shock s is realized on the election date, if and only if:
−φ1(wˆ − w)− φ2(pˆ− p) + µ(s, Y ) + ξk ≥ 0,
with parameters φi > 0 and µ(s, Y ), and individual shock ξk with CDF F (ξk;λ) where λ is
a parameter governing the distribution. Vector Y is a set of election-specific variables that
will be described further in the empirical section. The parameters φ1 and φ2 reflect the
marginal disutility from higher wages and pensions, respectively, while µ(s, Y ) reflects the
competitiveness of the district. For instance, a higher value of µ(s, Y ) implies that, holding
fixed other terms, the incumbent party will receive a higher vote share. With a unit mass
of voters, the politician’s expected vote share is:
1− F (φ1(wˆ − w) + φ2(pˆ− p)− µ(sT+1, Y );λ).
If the old contract is in place at the time of the vote, there is an exogenous cost dg(sT+1, D).
Thus, the expected terminal utility conditional on disagreement is:
1− F (φ1(wˆ − w) + φ2(pˆ− p)− µ(sT+1, Y );λ)− dg(sT+1, D).
The disagreement cost here can reflect dissatisfaction voters have from gridlock, or a dimin-
ished value from being in office due to further gridlock.
In sum, the governor’s utility from reaching agreement (w∗, p∗) in state s and period t is
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given by:
Ug(w
∗, p∗, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γt = n(s,D) + δEst+1|sn(st+1, D) + ...+ δ
T−tEsT |sn(sT , D)
− c1(s,D)(w∗ − w)− (c2(s,D)− cf2fun)(p∗ − p)
+ δT−t+1EsT+1|s[1− F (φ1(w∗ − w) + φ2(p∗ − p)
− µ(sT+1, Y ))] + γt.
That is, Ug is the utility of the governor excluding the unobservable component γt. The
first component consists of the flow utilities from agreeing to a new contract. The second is
the one-time cost from agreement (w∗, p∗), given funding levels. The third is the discounted
utility from the expected vote share.
An outcome of this game is either: (i) a vector (τ, w∗, p∗), where τ ≤ T is a stopping
time (i.e. period of agreement), and (w∗, p∗) is the agreed upon wage and pension; or (ii)
disagreement. The outcome implies payoffs to each party as follows. If there is agreement
in τ , the discounted present value of the payoff to u is:
τ−1∑
t=0
δtuu(w, p,X, τw, τp) +
T∑
t=τ
δtuu(w
∗, p∗, X, τw, τp) + δT+1Υuu(w∗, p∗, X, τw, τp),
while for g it is:
∑τ−1
t=0 δ
to(st, D) + δ
τ
(−c1(sτ , D)(w∗ − w)− c2(sτ , D)(p∗ − p))+∑Tt=τ δtn(st, D) +
δT+1[1− F (φ1(w∗ − w) + φ2(p∗ − p)− µ(sT+1, Y );λ)] + γτ .
If instead the bargaining spell ends in disagreement, then the payoff to u is:
T∑
t=0
δtuu(w, p,X, τw, τp) + δ
T+1
(
Υuu(w, p,X, τw, τp)− du(sT+1)
)
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and to g it is:
T∑
t=0
δto(st, D) + δ
T+1 (1− F (−µ(sT+1, Y );λ)− dg(sT+1, D)) .
A history is a sequence of realized states, proposers, γ shocks, wage-pension offers, and
acceptances or rejections in each period up to that point. A strategy for player i ∈ {g, u}
specifies an action (either a contract offer or an accept-reject rule) at every possible history
in which he or she acts. Each possible T + 1 length history induces an outcome and payoffs
to the governor and the union. The strategies are subgame perfect if, at every possible
history, each is a best response to the other player’s strategy. Given that this is a finite
horizon game, and that there exists an optimal strategy at each state and date there exist
unique SPE payoffs. Proposition 1 formalizes this.
Proposition 1. A SPE of this game exists, and there exists a unique set of SPE payoffs.
Appendix 1.8.2 presents the proof of Proposition 1, as well as all other proofs. Note that
although there may not be unique SPE strategies, there are unique payoffs. The reason
strategies may not be unique is when the proposer is either indifferent or strictly worse off
from making the best possible offer that still induces acceptance. However, in all of these
equilibria the SPE payoffs are identical.
Solving the Model
Given that it is a finite game of complete and perfect information, I can solve the game
for SPE payoffs and strategies using backward induction. Let vi(s, t, κ) denote the ex-ante
value function for agent i ∈ {g, u} in state s ∈ S and date t ∈ {1, ..., T} when κ is the
proposer. For notational simplicity, I abstract from dependence of the value functions on
other observables. “Ex-ante” here refers to prior to the realization of the γt shock, but after
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the state and proposer are realized. At time T + 1, the value functions are:
vg(s, T + 1, κ) = 1− F (−µ(s, Y ))− dg(s,D), (6)
vu(s, T + 1, κ) = Υ
(
(w(1− τw))1−σ
1− σ + η(X)
(
p(1− τp)
)1−σ
1− σ
)
− du(s) (7)
for each s and κ. Here, since γt enters additively and is mean-zero, it does not directly
appear in either value function at time T + 1.
At time t ≤ T , when the governor proposes in state s with shock γt, the optimal offer is the
solution to the program:
max
(w,p)∈R2+
Ug(w, p, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γt (8)
s.t. Uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) = uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) + δEκ′,s′|svu(s′, t+ 1, κ′).
Note first that since the governor’s utility is linear in γt, the optimal offer does not depend
on γt. To solve, for each w find the pension level that satisfies the constraint, denoted
pgs,t(w). That is, p
g
s,t(ŵ) is the value of p̂ such that:
Uu(ŵ, p̂, X, τw, τp) = uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) + δEκ′,s′|svu(s′, t+ 1, κ′).
Given this function, the optimal w∗ satisfies:
max
w≥0
Ug(w, p
g
s,t(w), s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γt,
with the associated optimal pension pgs,t(w
∗).28
Let (wgs,t, p
g
s,t) denote the optimal offer by the governor at state s in time t. The governor
then compares the utility from this contract with his continuation utility. There is agreement
28I show in the proof of Proposition 1 that either: (i) an optimal offer exists, or (ii) any offer the governor
makes will not be accepted, and thus he either makes a rejected offer or passes. For expositional purposes,
I consider the case where an optimal offer exists.
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if and only if:29
γt ≥ o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′)− Ug(wgs,t, pgs,t, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) ≡ γgs,t,
which occurs with probability:
1−Hγ
(
γg
s,t
)
.
Note that while the cutoff rule depends on observables, I suppress this dependence for
notational simplicity.
The ex-ante value functions are then:
vg(s, t, g) = Hγ(γ
g
s,t
)
(
o(s,D) + δEs′|s,κ′vg(s′, t+ 1, κ′)
)
+
(1−Hγ(γgs,t))Ug(w
g
s,t, p
g
s,t, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) +
∫ ∞
γgs,t
γ dHγ(γ; θ)
vu(s, t, g) = uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) + δEκ′,s′|svu(s′, t+ 1, κ′).
When the union proposes at time t in state s, the optimal offer now depends on the real-
ization of γt. The optimal offer solves:
max
(w,p)∈R2+
Uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) (9)
s.t. Ug(w, p, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γt = o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′).
Note here that, unlike in the case in which the governor proposes, the constraint depends on
γt. Thus, the set of pension and wages satisfying the constraint depends on the realization
of the shock. That is, one can solve the constraint for optimal p as a function of w and
γt, denoted p
u
s,t(w, γt). Then, after plugging into the objective function, the optimal wage
29If this holds with equality, then it could be in equilibrium that the governor does not make an offer. As
this only occurs for a measure zero of γ, this does not change any of the results, and thus I assume if the
proposer is indifferent, he makes the offer.
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offer, given γt, satisfies:
max
w≥0
Uu(w, p
u
s,t(w, γt), X, τw, τp)
Although in this case the function pus,t(w, γt) cannot be solved for in closed form, it can be
solved for numerically. Furthermore, the implicit function theorem gives the derivative of
this function with respect to w, which is needed when taking the first-order condition.
The following lemma states that, when proposing, the union follows a cutoff rule. That is,
the union proposes if and only if γt is sufficiently large. Intuitively, if γt increases, then the
governor is more inclined to accept this period, and therefore the union can extract more
of the surplus, if there is any.
Leamma 1. The union follows a cutoff rule such that, for all γt ≥ γus,t, an offer is made
and accepted, and for all γt < γ
u
s,t
the union passes.
The following lemma argues that in all states and dates, the cutoff rule is independent of
the proposer.
Leamma 2. In any SPE, for all s and t, γg
s,t
= γu
s,t
.
Given this, let γ
s,t
denote the cutoff shock at time t and state s. Furthermore, I denote
the optimal offer by the union in state s, time t, and with shock γ by (wus,t(γ), p
u
s,t(γ)).
The ex-ante value functions in period t and state s when the union proposes are then given
by:
vg(s, t, u) = o(s,D) + δEs′|s,κ′vg(s′, t+ 1, κ′)
vu(s, t, u) = Hγ(γs,t)
(
uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) + δEκ′,s′|svu(s′, t+ 1, κ′)
)
+∫ ∞
γ
t,s
Uu(w
u
s,t(γ), p
u
s,t(γ), X, τw, τp) dHγ(γ; θ).
Furthermore, conditional on reaching period t without agreement, the probability of agree-
ment at t in state s is given by 1−Hγ
(
γ
s,t
)
. Given a history of states sT , the probability
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that delay is zero (again, implicitly given observables) is 1−Hγ
(
γ
s0,0
)
. The probability of
a delay of length 1 ≤ N ≤ T is:
(
N−1∏
n=0
Hγ
(
γ
sn,n
))
×
(
1−Hγ
(
γ
sN ,N
))
,
while the probability of disagreement, which is a delay of T + 1, is:
T∏
n=0
Hγ
(
γ
sn,n
)
.
Similarly, the model will imply a distribution of wages and pensions.
The set of ex-ante value functions can be solved by backward induction, similar to the
theoretical model. As the integrals are not in closed form, I use Monte Carlo integration
techniques to compute them.
Empirical Specification
I now describe the empirical specification of the model. I assume that the structure of the
γ shocks is as follows. In bargaining spell b in geographic state j at time t, the γ shock
is γt,b,j = γ
1
t,b,j + γ
2
t,j , where γ
1
t,b,j ∼ N (0, θ1) and γ2t,j ∼ N (0, θ2), both iid over time and
independent of each other. That is, the shock is composed of an idiosyncratic component
and a component that is common to all unions in the same state that are bargaining at the
same time. This captures the common factors of bargaining and helps match the observed
correlations in outcomes among unions in the same state bargaining at the same time. For
the remainder of this section, I denote the sum of the idiosyncratic and geographic state-
specific shocks as γt, suppressing dependence on bargaining unit and geographic state. The
CDF γt is then Nγ(·; θ1 + θ2), with θ1 + θ2 as the variance of the shock. Note that this does
not change any of the results from the previous section, and the shock is still observed by
both players, but not the econometrician.
Next, I assume in empirical implementation that X = {geo. state, PS}. That is, the
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weight on pension utility for the union, η(X), depends on the geographic state and PS,
an indicator for public safety unions. This specification captures the large differences in
pension size between public safety and non-public safety unions, likely due in part to the
fact that public safety workers tend to retire earlier due to more strenuous work, and thus
may value pensions more than wages relative to non-public safety workers. Furthermore,
the dependence on geographic state helps match differences across different geographic
states.
I assume that Y = {OS, C˜PV I}, where OS is a dummy variable for if the next election is
an open seat election. This captures the effect of incumbency on expected vote share. The
variable C˜PV I is the Cook Partisan Voting Index in favor of the governor’s party at the
beginning of bargaining.30 As described in the data section, the standard CPVI measures
the degree to which the district leans Democrat or Republican according to previous presi-
dential election vote shares. I adjust this measure so that C˜PV I is positive if the district
leans in the same direction as the governor’s party, and is negative otherwise. This captures
overall district partisanship and affects the expected vote share.
I make the following functional form assumptions and normalizations for empirical imple-
mentation. First, I assume for simplicity that o(s,D) = 0 for all s and D. I assume that all
parameters depending on the state are linear in s. Explicitly, for each party D ∈ {dem, rep},
I assume there are two parameters nD1 and n
D
S . Then, I let the benefit to a governor from
being under a new contract be:
n(s,D) = nD1 +
s− 1
S − 1(n
D
S − nD1 ), for all s ∈ {1, ..., S}.
30The CPVI can in principle change if a bargaining spell overlaps with presidential election. In 11 states,
gubernatorial elections are typically held in the same year as presidential elections. In three states, they are
12 months prior; in 36 states they are 24 months prior; and in two states, they are 36 months prior. Note this
sums to 52, since New Hampshire and Vermont hold elections every two years. Thus, delay must be quite
long for the CPVI to change. Furthermore, the CPVI does not typically change significantly over different
presidential elections, especially within sample. Since allowing it to vary stochastically would increase the
state space and increase the time to solve the model with only minor benefits, I abstract from varying CPVI
within a bargaining spell.
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The terminal disagreement cost for the governor dg(s,D) takes the form:
dg(s,D) = d
D
g,1 +
s− 1
S − 1(d
D
g,S − dDg,1), for all s ∈ {1, ..., S}
with parameters {dDg,1, dDg,S}D∈{dem,rep}. The terminal disagreement cost takes the form:
du(s) = du,1 +
s− 1
S − 1(du,S − du,1), for all s ∈ {1, ..., S}
with parameters du,1 and du,S .
The one-time costs for the governor from agreement depend on the state and the party.
Both c1(s,D) and c2(s,D), and take the forms:
ci(s,D) = c
D
i,1 +
s− 1
S − 1(c
D
i,S − cDi,1) for D ∈ {dem, rep}, s ∈ {1, ..., S}, and i ∈ {1, 2},
with parameters {cD1,1, cD1,S , cD2,1, cD2,S}D∈{dem,rep}.
I assume that µ(s, Y ) takes the form:
µ(s, Y ) = µ1 +
s− 1
S − 1(µS − µ1) + χ1C˜PV I + χ2OS, for all s ∈ {1, ..., S},
with parameters µ1, µS , χ1, and χ2. I also assume ξk is exponentially distributed with
parameter λ.
In specifying the union’s relative benefit from pension, I assume that η(X) = ηj + ηps,jPS
for geographic state j. The parameters ηj are the geographic state-specific relative value
of pensions to wages, and ηps,j are the (also geographic state-specific) additional value for
public safety unions. This reflects the fact that public safety employees typically retire
earlier and value pensions more. It also is to match the empirical regularity that public
safety employees have typically larger pensions. The heterogeneity in the value of pen-
sions also captures differences across states, including the age-structure of public sector
employees.
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In stochastic bargaining models the proposal probability partially determines the bargaining
power of each side. Intuitively, public sector workforces with stronger unions may have
more bargaining power. Thus, I assume the probability the union proposes depends on the
percentage of public sector workers in a union, denoted MEM , and is given by:
Πu(MEM) = Πu + β1MEM.
Finally, I specify the state space as follows. For each geographic state, I compute the mean
unemployment rate since 1976. Then, for each monthly observation of unemployment, I take
the deviation from the state average and denote it UEj,t for geographic state j in month
t. I then define discrete bins with cutoffs {UE1, ..., UES−1}, independent of the geographic
state, such that state s = 1 corresponds to UEj,t ≤ UE1, states s ∈ {2, ..., S−1} correspond
to UEj,t ∈ (UEs−1, UEs], and state s = S corresponds to UEj,t > UES−1. This then
defines, for each geographic state and month, a state in the Markov process. In empirical
implemetation, I assume S = 8, with {UE1, UE2, ..., UE7} = {−2.5,−1.5, ..., 3.5}.
This fully specifies the empirical model. Letting G denote the set of geographic states, the
model parameters are:
Θ ≡{{{pir,s}}Sr,s=1, {{dDg,s, nDs , cD1,s, cD2,s}s∈{1,S}}D∈{dem,rep}, cf2 , φ1, φ2, λ, χ1, χ2,
{µs, du,s}s∈{1,S}, {ηj , ηps,j}j∈G ,Υ, δ, σ, θ1, θ2,Πu, β1}.
Given that S = 8 and #G = 17, in total there are 131 parameters: 64 for the transition
probabilities, 34 for the weights on pensions in the union’s utility, and 33 other parame-
ters. I normalize the initial wage w to 1, and all other variables are relative to the initial
salary.
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1.5 Calibration and Fit
In this section I discuss the calibration of the model and document the model fit. First, I
estimate {{pir,s}}Sr,s=1 outside of the model from the observed transition probabilities in the
data. Table 2 shows the estimated transition matrix.
Table 2
Probability of Transition, State i to j
i, j s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
s1 0.9239 0.0761 0 0 0 0 0 0
s2 0.0221 0.9313 0.0456 0.0008 0 0 0 0
s3 0.0002 0.0029 0.9305 0.0395 0.0003 0.0002 0 0
s4 0 0.0002 0.0461 0.9153 0.0380 0.0004 0 0
s5 0 0 0 0.0659 0.8935 0.0400 0.0006 0
s6 0 0 0 0 0.0716 0.8833 0.0441 0.0009
s7 0 0 0 0 0 0.0927 0.8622 0.0451
s8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0612 0.9368
For δ, I use the monthly discount factor of 0.99 and I set σ = 3, both consistent with many
estimates from the literature (see Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006), for example,
which uses σ = 3 and β = 0.96 for a model with one-year periods). Given these, I assume
that Υ = 100 since it is approximately 11−δ , which would be the weight for an infinitely
lived union.31
I set the voter preference parameters Θvot = {{µs}s∈{1,S}, φ1, φ2, λ, χ1, χ2} to match, given
the observed contract wage and pension (w∗, p∗), initial wage and pension (w, p), terminal
state sT+1, and vote shares. More precisely, for bargaining spell b, let V Db the vote differ-
ence between the incumbent’s party and the opposition party in the following election as
observed in the data. The implied vote difference from the model, given parameters, wages
w∗b and wb, pensions p
∗
b and pb, observables C˜PV Ib and OSb, and terminal state sTb+1,
31Note that the results are not particularly sensitive to these parameters.
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is:
V Db(Θvot; w
∗
b , wb, p
∗
b , pb, sTb+1, C˜PV Ib, OSb) =
1− 2F (φ1(w∗b − wb) + φ2(p∗b − pb)− µ(sTb+1, C˜PV Ib, OSb);λ).
I then pick the voting preference parameters Θvot to minimize:
∑
b
(V Db − V Db(Θvot;w∗b , wb, p∗b , pb, sTb+1, C˜PV Ib, OSb))2.
Note if the bargaining spell b ends in disagreement, I let w∗b = w, and p
∗
b = p.
I set ηj and ηps,j as follows. Consider a union in state j facing tax rates τw and τp whose
problem is to maximize their “steady state” utility:
(w(1− τw))1−σ
1− σ + η̂b
(p(1− τp))1−σ
1− σ
subject to allocating a fixed amount of income between wages and pensions,32 given a weight
η̂b on pensions. That is, the solution to such a maximization problem would give the optimal
wage-pension ratio. The solution to this problem would imply:
η̂b =
pσ(1− τ jw)1−σ
wσ(1− τ jp)1−σ
.
Therefore, I set ηj to be the average value of η̂b among all non-public safety unions in state
j, evaluated at (w, p). I set ηps,j to be the be such that ηj + ηps,j is the average value of η̂b
among all public safety unions in state j.
I normalize Πu = 0.45 and β1 = 0.1 since intuitively one may expect higher union member-
ship rates to have more bargaining power. It also implies that a state in which membership
is MEMb = 0.5 will have Πu+β1MEMb = 0.5. I set θ1 = θ2, and then calibrate θ ≡ θ1 +θ2
to match the observed spread in wages and pensions given the other parameters.
32The amount to be allocated does not matter given the preferences.
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The remaining parameters are flow benefits n(s,D), one-time agreement costs c1(s,D),
c2(s,D), and c
f
2 , and disagreement costs du(s) and dg(s,D). For intuition on how these
distinctly affect bargaining, consider again the governor’s utility from agreement:
n(s,D) + δEst+1|sn(st+1, D) + ...+ δ
T−tEsT |sn(sT , D)
− c1(s,D)(w∗ − w)− (c2(s,D)− cf2fun)(p∗ − p)
+ δT−t+1EsT+1|s[1− F (φ1(w∗ − w) + φ2(p∗ − p)− µ(sT+1, Y ))] + γt.
The first line corresponds to the flow benefits. Note that when bargaining is in a period far
from T , then this involves a sum of a potentially large number of terms. Thus, if flow benefits
are relatively high, in early periods there will be more pressure for the governor to reach
agreement all else equal. This will primarily affect both the hazard rate of bargaining spells
and the decline in wages as delay increases. The second line corresponds to the one-time
costs. These primarily affect the relative levels of wage and pension growth. The third line
consists of the discounted benefit from the vote share and the γt shock, which have already
been discussed. The final component, which does not appear in the utility from agreement,
are the disagreement costs. These tend to affect the probability of disagreement especially
among bargaining spells that last close to T , since early in bargaining it is discounted
relatively heavily. They also affect the levels of compensation throughout bargaining. Thus,
these remaining parameters all tend to have stronger effects on different dimensions of
bargaining outcomes.
To calibrate du(s) and dg(s,D), I calibrate in three steps. First, to set the difference
between du,1 and du,S , I consider the following. Since these parameters in part reflect the
future value of continuing bargaining after the election, note that if the union in bargaining
spell b disagrees, his utility is:
Υ
(
(w(1− τw))1−σ
1− σ + η(X)
(
p(1− τp)
)1−σ
1− σ
)
− du(s).
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To calibrate du,S − du,1, I first for du,S take the difference between the average utility from
observed agreements with spells beginning in state S (given preference parameters) and the
average utility from initial contracts. Then, for du,S I calculate the same for bargaining
spells beginning in state 1. I finally scale these by Υ and take the difference.
Second, for dDg,S−dDg,1, I consider spells that last until the final bargaining period. Given the
values of other parameters, I compute the values of dDg,S and d
D
g,1 that imply the probability
of disagreement observed among these spells in the data by party. The difference between
these two values gives the calibrated level of dDg,S−dDg,1. Finally, to calibrate the levels of the
disagreement costs, I jointly adjust them so that, given other parameters, the model roughly
matches both the average levels of compensation and overall probability of disagreement in
the full sample.
This leaves {{{nDs , cD1,s, cD2,s}s∈{1,S}}D∈{dem,rep}, cf2}. I calibrate the flow benefits to roughly
match average delay, the hazard rate of bargaining spells, and the decline in wages as
delay increases, each by party. I calibrate the one-time costs cD1,s, c
D
2,s, and c
f
2 to roughly
match the relative values of wages and pensions by party, and the responsiveness of pension
growth to changes in funding. Table 5 in appendix 1.8.1 presents the calibrated parameter
values.
1.5.1 Model Fit
Given these calibrated parameters, I solve the model and then generate model simulations
for the various bargaining spells in the data. Fixing the parameters and given the set
of observables for each bargaining spell, I solve the model using backward induction as
discussed above. Then, I draw a realized sequence of {{γ1t,b,j}b, γ2t,j}}t,j and, using the true
sequence of unemployment rates, I use the decision rules to find a realized delay time, wage,
and pension agreement, or disagreement if none is reached. This gives a distribution of
agreements and delays that can be compared to the data to see how well the model is
performing.
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For these simulations, in the initial period, I draw two values for {{γ10,b,j}b, γ20,j}}j each.
I assume that the maximum of each shock is the realized draw for the shock, and after
observing all shocks, both sides make their offers and decisions. This is due to the fact that,
in reality, bargaining may occur multiple periods before the begin date of the contract. This
is not explicitly modeled because I do not have information on when bargaining between the
governor and union actually begins for all states. It also helps to match the large number
of bargaining spells with no delay. Note that this adjustment does not affect any of the
cutoff rules in any state or date, since it occurs in the initial period and the solution method
involves backward induction. It simply increases the probability of there being agreement
in the initial period.
Table 3 presents the sample means for delay, net wage changes, and net pension changes
for the data and simulations, both in the aggregate and by party. Furthermore, Figures 7
and 8 show the distributions of net wage and pension changes conditional on agreement,
respectively. The top graphs in each panel show the distribution of simulated output, while
the bottom graphs present the data. The model generates sample means for the outcome
variables close to those in the data. The mean net wage change in both the data and the
simulations is approximately -1.83 percentage points. For net pension changes, the mean
in the data is -1.64 percentage points, while in the simulations it is -1.73 percentage points.
Additionally, the model only slightly overstates average delay. In the data, mean delay is
approximately 6.93 months, whereas in the simulations it is 7.07 months. Thus, the model
does relatively well in broadly matching the average compensation changes and delay in the
data.
Looking more closely at the unconditional distributions of wages and pensions, I note several
features. First, while the model broadly captures the shapes and ranges of the distributions,
the distribution of simulated wages is more concentrated than that of the data. However,
the standard deviations are similar: in the data it is about 2.44, whereas in the simulations
it is 2.20. The distribution of pension changes are more noticeably different, namely in
that, in the data, there are some extreme values. However, outside of these values, the
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Table 3
Sample Means, Data and Simulation
Data Simulated
All Dem. Rep. Diff All Dem. Rep. Diff
Delay 6.929 6.307 7.757 -1.450* 7.066 6.494 7.829 -1.335
(in mos.) (0.400) (0.486) (0.670) (0.828) (0.435) (0.532) (0.724) (0.898)
Avg. ∆w -1.833 -1.654 -2.080 0.427* -1.825 -1.604 -2.135 0.531**
(in pp) (0.125) (0.168) (0.185) (0.250) (0.109) (0.136) (0.175) (0.222)
Avg. ∆p -1.640 -1.081 -2.410 1.328*** -1.726 -1.313 -2.306 0.994***
(in pp) (0.225) (0.264) (0.384) (0.476) (0.078) (0.105) (0.101) (0.145)
distribution of data is slightly less dispersed around the mean than in the simulations. The
standard deviations of net pension changes are also noticeably different, at 4.44 for the data
and 1.60 for the simulations, driven largely in part by the outliers.
Figure 7
Distributions of Net Wage Changes, Simulated vs. Data
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The model also predicts delay times. Figure 9 shows the distributions of delay in the
simulations versus the data. The model does a relatively good job at matching the broad
36
Figure 8
Distributions of Net Pension Changes, Simulated vs. Data
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patterns in the data. Note the large spike at a delay time of zero in both the simulations
and the data, corresponding to the large number of bargaining spells that reach agreement
before the contract begins. This mean of the distribution of delay in the data is 6.93 months,
while the simulations it is 7.07. The standard deviations of delay are 8.23 in the data and
8.93 in the simulations.
The distributions can also be broken down by party of the governor. Figure 10 shows
the simulated wages and pension changes by party. The top panel shows net real wage
changes and the bottom panel shows net real pension changes. The top row of each panel
shows simulated output and the bottom row shows the data. Within each panel, the left
column shows the results for Republican governors, and the right does so for Democrats.
In the simulations, the mean pension change for Republicans is -2.31 percentage points,
whereas for Democrats it is -1.31. In the data, it is -2.41 percentage points for Republicans
and -1.08 for Democrats. The model captures the fact that pension changes are smaller
under Republicans. For wages, under Republicans the average wage growth conditional
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Figure 9
Distributions of Delay, Simulated vs. Data
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Figure 10
Distributions of Simulated Model Output, By Party
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on agreement in the simulations is -2.14 percentage points, while in the data it is -2.08.
For Democrats, the average simulated wage is -1.60, while the average in the data is -
1.65. Again, the model accurately captures the differences in wage increases by party,
in particular that wage growth is smaller under Republicans. As noted in Table 3, the
differences across parties for wage and pension changes are significant in both the data and
the simulations.
Figure 11 shows the delay distributions by party. The mean delay in the data for Democrats
is 6.31 months, whereas for Republicans it is 7.76. In the simulations, mean delay for
Democrats is 6.49 months, while for Republicans it is 7.83. Furthermore, the distributions of
delay by party in the simulations are relatively similar to those in the data. For Democrats,
the standard deviation of the distribution in the data is 7.54, while in the data it is 8.25. For
Republicans, it is 9.01 in the data and 9.73 in the simulations. Thus, the model captures
the relative differences in delay by party observed in the data.
Finally, I show that the model captures the negative relationship between delay and average
wage changes observed in the data. Similar to Figure 6, the plots in Figure 12 show the
average wage change among all contracts with a given level of delay. The top panel is for
Democrats, while the bottom is for Republicans. Within each panel, the blue line plots the
average wage change for each level of delay in the data, while the red line plots the same
for the simulations. The blue and red dashed lines are the fitted lines for the data and
simulations, respectively. Note that the model captures the observation in the data that
average wage changes tend to be smaller in bargaining spells featuring longer delay. For
Democrats, the slope of the fitted line for the data is approximately -0.063, while in the
simulations it is -0.064. This implies that in the sample, bargaining spells with 10 months
longer delay have approximately smaller wage increases by approximately 0.6 percentage
points. The simulations match this feature well. For Republicans, the model implies slightly
larger sensitivity of average wage changes to delay. The slope of the fitted line in the data
is -0.016, while in the simulations it is -0.041. Still, overall the model does capture this
negative relationship observed in the data.
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Figure 11
Distributions of Delay, Simulated vs. Data, By Party
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Figure 12
Mean Wages by Delay
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1.6 Counterfactuals
To further investigate the implications of the model, I run several counterfactuals to inves-
tigate the importance of different political and economic factors on bargaining outcomes.
First, to understand the impact of the governor’s party on the various bargaining outcomes,
I consider a bargaining spell with median median levels of union membership, taxes, and
C˜PV Ii. I also assume the spell involves a non-public safety union, and take the median
values of ηj and p in the sample. Given the values and the calibrated parameters, I solve
the game varying party and T . Then, with the model solutions, I simulate realizations of
the economics states in S, as well as the shocks {{γ1t,b,j , γ2t,j}}.33 I also vary the initial state
for the shock across these simulations to understand the effect of initial unemployment on
bargaining outcomes.
The results for the average of N = 1000 simulations for delay, wage changes, and pension
changes are plotted in Figures 13, 14, and 15 respectively. The top left panel plots outcomes
for Democrats, while the top right plots them for Republicans. The bottom panel plots
Democrats minus Republicans, so a negative number indicates Democrats have shorter
delay than Republicans. For each panel, length of bargaining spell T is on the x-axis, and
the y-axis is delay in months. Each different line in the plots corresponds to the average
for a different initial state s0.
As in the aggregate statistics, Democrats generally have a shorter delay times than Repub-
licans, with interesting non-linear effects. For instance, for bargaining spells beginning 40
months prior to the next election, average delay is about 4 months longer when the initial
state is bad, while it is only about 0.5 months longer in a good state. For a bargaining
length of T = 16, the difference is generally around 1 month for good and bad states, and
only about 0.2 to 0.4 months for average states.
Finally, note that the response of delay to changes in T depends strongly on the initial state
33Note that here the distinction between the two shocks is not relevant, as I only consider one election in
a given state.
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s0. The intuition for this is the following. In good states, the cost of delay is relatively
high since the flow benefits conditional on agreement n(s,D) are high. Therefore, if the
governor chooses to disagree early in bargaining, there is a positive probability he will have
to go several periods with low flow benefits o(s,D) = 0. Furthermore, the larger T is, the
higher is the potential number of periods with low flow benefits. Thus, regardless of T ,
there is strong pressure early in bargaining to reach agreement – in fact, it can be stronger
for larger T , which explains why, when s0 = 2, average delay in fact declines slightly as T
grows. However, in bad states n(s,D) is low, potentially even negative. Therefore, when
T is large, there is little pressure to reach agreement since disagreement costs are far in
the future. The union and governor can mutually benefit from waiting for a better state
or γ shock to come, so long as they do not get too close to the terminal date. Instead,
for small T both sides are already close to the disagreement costs, so they tend to reach
agreement quickly. Thus, the dynamics are in part driven by the relative importance of
flow and disagreement costs, which depend on the initial state and T .
Figure 13
Average Delay, Simulations
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Figure 14
Average Real Wage Changes, Simulations
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Figure 15
Average Real Pension Changes, Simulations
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Looking at Figure 14, we see essentially the opposite dynamic, namely that wage growth
is more sensitive to changes in T when unemployment is low. Again, the logic deals with
the flow benefits and proximity to the disagreement costs. In the good state, when T is
large, early in bargaining the governor has strong incentives to reach agreement in order
to guarantee himself high flow benefits for the remaining periods. Thus, the governor will
agree to relatively large compensation increases. However, when T is small, the potential
number of periods of foregone flow benefits is small, so the governor is less willing to
agree to compensation increases. Note that the union does not face a symmetric type of
pressure to agree early, since it does not have associated direct flow benefits. Therefore, it
disproportionately benefits from the increases in T in good states. In contrast, in bad states,
flow benefits are low and thus there is little pressure on the governor to reach agreement
in any value of T . Thus, for all values of T , agreements tend to feature relatively low wage
growth. Note from Figure 15 that the dynamics of pension growth are very similar.
The counterfactuals also demonstrate that, in almost all specifications, Democrats agree to
higher wage and pension growth than Republicans. For instance, when T = 16 and s0 = 4,
agreements with Democrats feature wage growth approximately 0.684 percentage points
higher than those with Republicans, with pension growth approximately 0.600 percentage
points higher. To put the differences in wage growth in monetary terms, suppose the
average salary of public sector workers is $50,000 per year.34 Furthermore, in 2008 the
median number of state public sector workers covered by a contract was 81,574. If each of
these workers received an additional 0.684 percentage point raise in a given year, that would
correspond to approximately $27,891,943 in increased wage outlays. While not enormous
in per capita terms, if this compounds over time, or if there are spillovers to public sector
workers not covered by a contract, then the difference in public sector compensation may
become significant.
In addition, I investigate the effect of pension funding levels on bargaining outcomes. I
solve the model for a bargaining spell with an upcoming open seat election, and with
34This is approximately correct, computed from American Community Survey 2008 data.
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median levels of all variables (including s0 = 4 and T = 16) except for party and funding
levels. I vary funding levels between the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles in the data and
simulate the model N = 1000 times to understand the effect of initial pension funding on
bargaining outcomes, depending on initial state and party. Table 4 shows the results for
wage and pension changes from the simulations. The model implies a tradeoff between
pensions and wages. A funding level of 106% versus 61% implies higher pension growth
by about 1.13 percentage points for Democrats and 0.9 percentage points for Republicans,
and similar sized declines in wage growth. Thus, in the model total compensation does
not significantly change as funding increases. Rather, improvements in pension funding
tend push the governor to substitute pensions in place of wages, since raising pensions is
relatively less costly.
Table 4
Simulated Means, Net Changes (in pp), By Funding
Democrat Republican
61% 85% 106% 61% 85% 106%
Wages -1.767 -2.396 -2.949 -2.566 -3.068 -3.532
Pensions -1.939 -1.349 -0.806 -2.428 -1.942 -1.515
The final exercise I perform is the following. In order to determine the degree to which
model outcomes are driven by the unobservable shock, I solve and simulate the model while
shutting down γt. Overall, the model without shocks generates slightly more delay and
disagreement, but still involves a significant probability of agreement. I find that the average
delay with no unobservable shocks is 8.17, with a 7.3% probability of disagreement. This
contrasts with an average delay of 7.07 in the full model, and a probability of disagreement
of 2.6%. Furthermore, the mean wage and pension growth implied by the model with the
unobservable shock, approximately -1.8 and -1.7 percentage points, respectively, are very
similar to those in the model without the shock, -2.2 and -1.9 percentage points. Thus,
the introduction of the unobservable component smooths the distributions of bargaining
outcomes, but overall it is not the dominant driver of model outcomes.
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1.7 Conclusion
Public sector compensation is a relatively sizable share of U.S. GDP, and has strained state
budgets in recent years as tax revenues declined due to the Great Recession. Despite this,
understanding the determinants of public sector compensation, and in particular the role of
political variables, is typically less focal in the literature. To this end, I develop a stochastic
bargaining model in which a governor and public union bargain over compensation. The
political and economic variables in the model affect both the propensity of sides to reach
agreement, as well as the terms of an agreement. For instance, in bad economic times, both
sides may want to postpone agreement until times get better and, say, the governor has more
political capital or the state budget is more flexible. Furthermore, the sensitivity to these
factors may depend on, for example, political party. Democrats may be more amenable
to reaching favorable terms of agreement to the union relative to Republicans. Thus, the
model has implications for the relationship between political and economic variables and
bargaining outcomes, namely delay, wage growth, and pension growth.
I use hand-collected data from various sources, including collective bargaining agreements
for state-level public sector unions, to calibrate the model and investigate the effects of
political and economic variables on bargaining outcomes. Using the calibrated model to run
counterfactuals, I find that wage and pension growth outcomes are higher under Democratic
governors, while delay is significantly shorter. Additionally, higher unemployment rates at
the beginning of bargaining tend to have a negative impact on compensation levels. The
magnitude of these responses is sensitive to time before the next election. I also find that
bargaining spells for unions with more well-funded pension plans tend to generate higher
pensions. Overall, the model sheds insight into how both political and economic factors
can affect public sector compensation, a topic that has arguably been understudied in the
past.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Additional Tables
Table 5
Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Dem. gov. disagree cost, s = 1: dDg,1 -18.552
Dem. gov. disagree cost, s = S: dDg,S -3.060
Rep. gov. disagree cost, s = 1: dRg,1 -24.473
Rep. gov. disagree cost, s = S: dRg,S -4.951
Dem. flow benefit, s = 1: nD1 0.950
Dem. flow benefit, s = S: nDS -0.650
Rep. flow benefit, s = 1: nR1 0.900
Rep. flow benefit, s = S: nRS -0.800
Dem. one-time wage cost, s = 1: cD1,1 69.063
Dem. one-time wage cost, s = S: cD1,S 340.000
Rep. one-time wage cost, s = 1: cR1,1 74.375
Rep. one-time wage cost, s = S: cR1,S 425.000
Dem. one-time pension cost, s = 1: cD2,1 105.625
Dem. one-time pension cost, s = S: cD2,S 381.875
Rep. one-time pension cost, s = 1: cR2,1 120.250
Rep. one-time pension cost, s = S: cR2,S 461.500
One-time pension cost adjustment, funding: cf2 40.000
Wage effect on vote share: φ1 31.330
Pension effect on vote share: φ2 14.725
Voter preference distribution parameter: λ 0.040
CPVI effect on vote share: χ1 0.128
Open seat effect on vote share: χ2 -2.271
Shifter for vote share, s = 1: µ1 -17.304
Shifter for vote share, s = S: µS -18.753
Union disagree cost, s = 1: du,1 2544.795
Union disagree cost, s = S: du,S 5649.630
Average pension weight, non-PS unions: mean(ηj) 0.428
Average pension weight, PS unions: mean(ηps,j) 0.345
Weight on union terminal utility: Υ 100
Common discount factor: δ 0.990
Coefficient of relative risk aversion: σ 3
γt,b,j-shock variance, s = 1: θ1 20
γt,j-shock variance: θ2 20
Baseline probability union proposes: Πu 0.450
Proposal probability adjustment, MEM : β1 0.100
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1.8.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. To see that a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) exists, first I
let vi(s, t, κ) denote the ex-ante value function for agent i ∈ {g, u} in state s ∈ S and date
t ∈ {1, ..., T} when κ is the proposer. For notational simplicity, I abstract from dependence
of the value functions on other observables. “Ex-ante” here refers to prior to the realization
of the γt shock, but after the state and proposer are realized.
Now, consider the case where the union is responding to a proposal (ŵ, p̂) from the gover-
nor in period T and state s. For notational convenience, I let CV us,T ≡ uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) +
δEκ′,s′|svu(s′, T + 1, κ′), which is the period T value to the union from not reaching agree-
ment. Clearly, in any SPE it must be that the union rejects an offer if Uu(ŵ, p̂, X, τw, τp) <
CV us,T and accepts if Uu(ŵ, p̂, X, τw, τp) > CV
u
s,T . Consider an offer that the union is indif-
ferent between accepting and rejecting, that is satisfying Uu(ŵ, p̂, X, τw, τp) = CV
u
s,T . Let
qus,T (ŵ, p̂) denote the union’s probability of accepting in period T and state s. I consider
four different cases:
1. Suppose (ŵ, p̂) solves the program:
max
(w,p)∈R2+
Ug(w, p, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γT (10)
s.t. Uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) = uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) + δEκ′,s′|svu(s′, T + 1, κ′),
and Ug(ŵ, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γT > o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, T + 1, κ′). For con-
ciseness, I will assume that (ŵ, p̂) is the unique solution to the program.35 Note that
in this case, the governor would prefer to reach agreement under (ŵ, p̂) than to pass.
If qus,T (ŵ, p̂) < 1, then there would be no optimal offer for the governor. To see this,
35If there are multiple maximizers, then at least one of the solutions must satisfy qus,T (w, p) = 1 by the
same logic. Note, however, that no matter which solution satisfies qus,T (w, p) = 1 the payoffs are identical
since all “maximizers” must give the same payoff to the governor and union by definition.
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the governor’s utility from offering (ŵ, p̂) would be:
qus,T (ŵ, p̂)(Ug(ŵ, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γT ) + (1− qus,T (ŵ, p̂))(o(s,D)+
δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, T + 1, κ′)) < Ug(ŵ, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γT .
Since union utility is increasing in wages, for all ε > 0, qus,T (ŵ+ ε, p̂) = 1. Thus, there
exists ε such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε)
qus,T (ŵ, p̂)(Ug(ŵ, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γT ) + (1− qus,T (ŵ, p̂))(o(s,D)+
δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, T + 1, κ′)) < Ug(ŵ + ε, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γT .
Furthermore, for any alternative offer (w′, p′) that is accepted with positive probabil-
ity, there exists ε′ < ε such that:
Ug(ŵ + ε
′, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) > Ug(w′, p′, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p).
This is because any other offer satisfying Uu(w
′, p′, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) ≥ CV us,T must
be such that:
Ug(ŵ, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) > Ug(w
′, p′, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p),
since (ŵ, p̂) is the maximizer of the governor’s utility subject to giving the union his
continuation value.
Since Ug(ŵ+ε
′, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p)→ Ug(ŵ, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) as ε′ → 0, this
implies that for any alternative offer (w′, p′) that may be accepted, there exists a
dominant one in (ŵ+ ε′, p̂) for sufficiently small ε′. Thus, qus,T (ŵ, p̂) < 1 would imply
there is no optimal offer, since the governor would prefer to make ε as small as possible,
but still strictly positive. Therefore, in any SPE it must be that qus,T (ŵ, p̂) = 1 if (ŵ, p̂)
solves program (10) and Ug(ŵ, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) > o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, T +
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1, κ′). In turn, the governor would strictly prefer to offer (ŵ, p̂) than to make an
alternative offer or to pass. Therefore, in such cases, there are unique payoffs at date
T and state s, namely Ug(ŵ, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) for the governor and CV
u
s,T for
the union.
2. Next, suppose (ŵ, p̂) solves (10), but instead Ug(ŵ, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) < o(s,D)+
δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, T + 1, κ′). Then any qus,T (ŵ, p̂) ∈ [0, 1] is possible in an SPE. This is
because the union is indifferent between accepting and rejecting, and furthermore the
governor would strictly prefer to pass instead of offering (ŵ, p̂), unless qus,T (ŵ, p̂) = 0
in which case he is indifferent. Thus, even though in this situation there are multi-
ple possible strategies in equilibrium, all of them yield the same payoffs to players.
Therefore, again there are unique payoffs in these cases at state s and date T , namely
each player’s continuation value.
3. Next, suppose (ŵ, p̂) does not solve (10). If the solution to (10), denoted (ŵ′, p̂′),
satisfies Ug(ŵ
′, p̂′, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) > o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, T + 1, κ′), then from
part (1) it must be that qus,T (ŵ
′, p̂′) = 1. Then, since the governor would strictly
prefer (ŵ′, p̂′) to offer (ŵ, p̂), any qus,T (ŵ, p̂) ∈ [0, 1] is possible in equilibrium. If
instead Ug(ŵ
′, p̂′, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) ≤ o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, T + 1, κ′), it must be
Ug(ŵ, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) < o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, T + 1, κ′), in which case the
governor would always prefer passing to offering (ŵ, p̂) regardless of qus,T (ŵ, p̂), again
implying that any qus,T (ŵ, p̂) ∈ [0, 1] is possible. However, note that in this case, (ŵ, p̂)
will not be on the path of play since there is a strictly preferred strategy for the
governor, given the equilibrium strategies of the union. Again, this does not affect
the uniqueness of payoffs.
4. Finally, suppose that (ŵ, p̂) solves (10) and Ug(ŵ, p̂, s, T ; fun, Y,D,w, p) = o(s,D) +
δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, T+1, κ′). In this case, both sides are indifferent between the best possible
agreement and passing. Therefore, any qus,T (ŵ, p̂) ∈ [0, 1] is possible, and the governor
will be indifferent between passing and offering (ŵ, p̂). However, in any of these cases,
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the equilibrium payoffs will be the same: o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, T + 1, κ′) for the
governor and CV us,T for the union.
Identical logic applies when the union is the proposer. Therefore, in period T , as long as
there exists an optimal offer (ŵ, p̂) or all offers will be rejected – which I show is the case
below – since the continuation payoffs are exogenous, the SPE payoffs in each state s are
unique. Given that the SPE payoffs at T are unique, the continuation values at time T − 1
are also unique, so the same logic applies to this period. Working backwards implies the
entire path of SPE payoffs are unique.
To complete the proof, I argue that either: (i) there always exists an optimal offer at each s
and t and for each proposer, or (ii) if an optimal offer doesn’t exist, it implies that passing
or making an offer that will be rejected with certainty is the optimal action for the proposer.
Letting:
A ≡
(
1−δT−t+1
1−δ
)
+ δT−t+1Υ
1− σ ,
the constraint when the governor determines its optimal offer is:
A
(
(w(1− τw))1−σ + η(X) (p(1− τp))1−σ
)
= CV us,t.
Algebraic manipulation yields
pgs,t(w) =
1
1− τp
(
1
η(X)
(
CV us,t
A
− (w(1− τw))1−σ
)) 1
1−σ
, (11)
where pgs,t(w) is the pension level, given a value of w that satisfies the constraint. Note that
for σ > 1,36 A is negative. Furthermore, so long as the disagreement costs for the union are
not too negative, the continuation value CV us,t is also negative, making
CV us,t
A > 0. I consider
the case where CV us,t > 0 below.
36Certainly σ could be less than one, and similar proofs would apply. To ease exposition, the proofs are
written assuming σ > 1 since the calibrated coefficient of relative risk aversion is larger than one.
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Also note that there is a lower bound on w, denoted wLB that satisfies
0 =
CV us,t
A
− (wLB(1− τw))1−σ ⇐⇒
wLB =
1
1− τw
(
CV us,t
A
) 1
1−σ
.
This is because for all w ≤ wLB, there is no finite pension level that induces acceptance on
the part of the union.
Then, the problem of the governor is:
max
w≥0
Ug(w, p
g
s,t(w), s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γt
The FOC of this is given by:
−c1(s,D)− (c2(s,D)− cf2fun)
∂pgs,t(w
∗)
∂w
− δT−t+1EsT+1|s
[
f(φ1(w
∗ − w)+ (12)
φ2(p
g
s,t(w
∗)− p)− µ(sT+1, Y ))
(
φ1 + φ2
∂pgs,t(w
∗)
∂w
)]
= 0,
where w∗ is the optimal wage offer and:
∂pgs,t(w)
∂w
= −1− τw
1− τp
(
1
η
) 1
1−σ
(
CV us,t
A
− (w(1− τw))1−σ
) σ
1−σ
(w(1− τw))−σ ,
which is strictly negative so long as w > wLB, which it must be at the optimum.
As w → wLB from above, ∂p
g
s,t(w)
∂w → −∞, and therefore the LHS of (12) approaches ∞.
Also, as w → ∞, since f(·) is bounded and ∂p
g
s,t(w
∗)
∂w → 0, the LHS of (12) approaches a
strictly negative number. Thus, there exists at least one wage that satisfies (12). Further-
more, for at least one of these wages, the second order condition is satisfied since the LHS
of (12) must be decreasing at one or more of them. Therefore, a finite optimal offer for the
governor exists when CV us,t < 0. Even if multiple w
∗ maximize the governor’s utility, by
definition they yield the same utility to both the governor and the union.
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If instead CV us,t ≥ 0 when σ > 1, this implies that the continuation value for the union
is so large that there is no positive and finite level of w and p the union is willing to
accept. Intuitively, when σ > 1, flow utilities are always negative for any positive w and p.
Therefore, if the continuation value for the union is positive, there is no way to satisfy the
union. In this case, any offer will be rejected, which implies unique utilities for both the
governor and the union.
Now consider the case in which the union proposes. The union solves for the optimal
contract conditional on inducing acceptance:
max
(w,p)∈R2+
Uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) (13)
s.t. Ug(w, p, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γt = o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′).
Similar to the case with the governor, for each possible wage w, one can solve for the pension
level that satisfies the constraint. However, in this case, the pension level also depends on
γt. Thus, the function p
u
s,t(w, γt) is defined to be the pension level, given w and γt that
satisfies the constraint. Note that this cannot be solved for in closed-form, though it can
be solved for numerically.
Plugging this into the objective function, the FOC for the modified problem is:
(w∗)−σ(1− τw)1−σ + η(X)pus,t(w∗, γt)−σ(1− τp)1−σ
(
∂pus,t(w
∗, γt)
∂w
)
= 0, (14)
where again w∗ is the optimal wage offer and the implicit function theorem from the con-
straint of (13) gives:
∂pus,t(w, γt)
∂w
= −c1(s,D) + δ
T−t+1Ef(φ1(w∗ − w) + φ2(pus,t(w∗, γt)− p)− µ(sT+1, Y ))φ1
c2(s,D) + δT−t+1Ef(φ1(w∗ − w) + φ2(pus,t(w∗, γt)− p)− µ(sT+1, Y )φ2
< 0.
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First, suppose o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′) is sufficiently small such that:
Ug(0, 0, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γt > o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′). (15)
If this inequality is satisfied, it implies that at a wage-pension offer of (w, p) = (0, 0), the
governor receives enough utility to strictly prefer the contract to passing. I define wUB to
be the wage such that pus,t(wUB, γt) = 0, which is defined by:
Ug(wUB, 0, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) = o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′).
Since the LHS is decreasing in the wage and approaches −∞, as long as (15) is satisfied,
intermediate value theorem implies wUB > 0 exists. As w → wUB, since ∂p
u
s,t(w,γt)
∂w < 0
the LHS of (14) approaches −∞. Furthermore, as w → 0, the LHS of (14) approaches ∞.
Thus, by the same logic as in the governor’s proposal, there must exist an optimal offer.
If alternatively (15) is not satisfied, this implies that the governor’s continuation value is
so high that he would (weakly) prefer to reject even an offer of w = p = 0. Thus, in this
case, it is also clearly optimal for the union to pass, or make an offer that will certainly be
rejected. Thus, at each date, state, and γt, there is always an optimal offer (or decision to
pass) for the proposer, which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. To begin the proof, I show that an optimal offer exists if and only if
γ > γ∗. To see this, given a value of γ, an optimal offer does not exist if and only if for all
(w, p):
Ug(w, p, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γ < o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′).
Since Ug is decreasing in w and p, if this inequality holds for γ, then it must also hold for
all γ′ < γ. Thus, with γ∗ satisfying:
Ug(0, 0, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γ
∗ = o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′),
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for all γ > γ∗ an optimal contract exists, and for all γ < γ∗, one does not exist. Thus, for
all γ < γ∗, there will be no agreement.
Next, consider γ > γ∗. Let (wus,t(γt), pus,t(γt)) denote the optimal offer when the union
proposes and the shock is γt. I now show that the utility of the union must be increasing in
γt. To see this, consider two realizations of the shock, γ
′ > γ. Then, consider the optimal
wage and pension when γ is the realization, denoted (w∗, p∗). Under γ′:
Ug(w
∗, p∗, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γ′ > Ug(w∗, p∗, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γ
= o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′),
so (w∗, p∗) is still feasible when γ′ is realized. Furthermore, since Ug is decreasing in w,
there exists a w′ > w∗ such that:
Ug(w
′, p∗, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γ′ = o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′).
Furthermore since Uu is increasing in w, Uu(w
′, p∗, X, τw, τp) > Uu(w∗, p∗, X, τw, τp). There-
fore, the optimal wage and pension offer under γ′ must provide strictly higher utility to the
union than the optimal offer under γ.
Since utility of the union evaluated at the optimal offer is strictly increasing in γ, and since
the union makes an offer if and only if:
Uu(w
u
s,t(γt), p
u
s,t(γt), s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) ≥ uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) + δEκ′,s′|svu(s′, t+ 1, κ′)
where the RHS does not depend on γ, the union follows a cutoff rule for making a proposal.
The cutoff shock, denoted γu
s,t
, satisfies:
Uu(w
u
s,t(γ
u
s,t
), pus,t(γ
u
s,t
), X, τw, τp) = uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) + δEκ′,s′|svu(s′, t+ 1, κ′).37
This completes the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 2. I prove by contradiction. Suppose instead that γu
s,t
6= γg
s,t
. Suppose
without loss of generality that γu
s,t
> γg
s,t
. By definition, it must be:
Uu(w
u
s,t(γ
u
s,t
), pus,t(γ
u
s,t
), X, τw, τp) = uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) + δEκ′,s′|svu(s′, t+ 1, κ′)
Ug(w
u
s,t(γ
u
s,t
), pus,t(γ
u
s,t
), s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γu
s,t
= o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′)
Uu(w
g
s,t, p
g
s,t, X, τw, τp) = uu(w, p,X, τw, τp) + δEκ′,s′|svu(s
′, t+ 1, κ′)
Ug(w
g
s,t, p
g
s,t, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γ
g
s,t
= o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′).
Note that since κ′ is independent of the current proposer, the continuation values for each
player are also independent of proposer. Therefore:
Ug(w
u
s,t(γ
u
s,t
), pus,t(γ
u
s,t
), s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γu
s,t
= Ug(w
g
s,t, p
g
s,t, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γ
g
s,t
,
which holds if and only if:
0 < γu
s,t
− γg
s,t
= Ug(w
g
s,t, p
g
s,t, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p)− Ug(wus,t(γus,t), pus,t(γus,t), s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p).
Finally, this holds if and only if:
Ug(w
g
s,t, p
g
s,t, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) > Ug(w
u
s,t(γ
u
s,t
), pus,t(γ
u
s,t
), s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p).
However, this also implies:
Ug(w
g
s,t, p
g
s,t, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γ
u
s,t
> o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′).
which in turn implies that the union’s offer is suboptimal. To see this, note that the union is
indifferent between (wgs,t, p
g
s,t) and (w
u
s,t(γ
u
s,t
), pus,t(γ
u
s,t
)). Furthermore, since the governor’s
utility is decreasing in the wage and the union’s is increasing, there exists an offer (w′, pgs,t)
with w′ = wgs,t+  that the union strictly prefers to (w
g
s,t, p
g
s,t) and (w
u
s,t(γ
u
s,t
), pus,t(γ
u
s,t
)) such
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that:
Ug(w
′, pgs,t, s, t; fun, Y,D,w, p) + γ
u
s,t
= o(s,D) + δEκ′,s′|svg(s′, t+ 1, κ′).
Thus, the offer (wus,t(γ
u
s,t
), pus,t(γ
u
s,t
)) is suboptimal, generating a contradiction.
1.8.3 Calculation of Tax Rates and Pensions
In order to calculate pension levels, I follow closely a procedure from Beshears et al (2011),
which makes assumptions about a representative worker’s age, income stream, tenure in
the public sector, and marital status.38 Then, using information on public sector pension
retirement factors and years used to compute final average salary for the particular union,
I can compute the gross pension for the representative worker. Given this I can compute a
gross pension for the initial year of retirement. I then use information from Beshears et al
(2011) on the tax treatment of public pensions in each geographic state, as well as NBER’s
TAXSIM program, to compute the average tax rate on retirement income, which in turn
gives the after-tax pension for the representative worker.
More specifically, I assume that the “representative” worker has the following characteris-
tics:
• At age 40, the worker has a $50,000 salary;
• The worker expects on average a 1% real wage increase for the remainder of her career;
• The worker will retire at age 65;
• The worker is single;
• By retirement, the worker will have been in the public sector for 30 years.
Let the assumed salary for the representative worker at age a be denoted Sala. Then, given
that the number of years used to compute final average salary is y and the retirement factor
38Marital Status is only relevant through its impact on the tax rate the worker will face.
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is RF , the pension (denoted Pen) for the worker is
Pen =
(
1
y
y−1∑
a=0
Sal65−a
)
×RF × 30,
where 30 comes from the assumed 30 years of tenure in the public sector.
The level of the initial pension is determined from the initial salary flow and initial pension
parameters. To compute p∗, one needs an assumption on the new income stream upon
agreement. Suppose the agreed upon gross wage increase is (1 + g). I assume that the
worker continues to expect a 1% real wage increase (on average) for the remainder of her
career. Thus, if the initial age a expected salary is Sala, then the new expected salary will
be Sal∗a = Sala(1 + g). In other words, the income stream will shift up by (1 + g). Then,
the p∗ computations are based on this new salary stream and the new pension parameters.
I normalize all pensions and wages by the initial wage level, i.e. $50,000 by assumption.
Thus, w ≡ 1, w∗ is the gross real wage increase, and p and p∗ are the initial and agreed
upon pensions, respectively, as a percentage of the initial salary ($50,000).
To determine τp, I draw from Beshears et al (2011), which provides the tax treatment of
public sector pensions. For instance, in some states, the full pension is taxable, while in
other states part or all of a public pension is not taxable.39 I use TAXSIM to obtain the
average federal and FICA tax rates using the initial pension level, Pen, as taxable income.
Furthermore, letting ρ be the fraction of public pension income that is taxable at the state
level, I use TAXSIM to obtain the average state tax rate using ρPen as taxable income.
These combined yield τp. For simplicity, I assume that this average tax rate also applies for
any new agreed upon pension.40 To obtain τw, given the assumption on the “representative”
worker, I simply take the assumed salary of $50,000 and compute the state, federal, and
FICA tax rates.
39At the federal level, public sector pensions are fully taxable in all states.
40Due to progressive taxation, this is an approximation, not an exact calculation. Technically, one would
use the marginal tax rates. However, since most changes are relatively small, the average taxes generally
provide a very close approximation.
60
Note that the assumption on the level of initial annual wage ($50,000) is not particularly
important. Alternative assumptions for the initial wage would only have a meaningful effect
on outcomes through its effects on the average tax rate, since everything is normalized by
the initial wage.
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Chapter 2 : Campaign Spending
and Strategy in U.S. Congressional
Elections∗
2.1 Introduction
Candidates running for political office spend a vast and ever-growing sum of money. In
the 2012 cycle, candidates running for seats in the U.S. Congress spent about $1.9 billion,
representing an increase of almost 50% in real terms relative to 2000. Despite this significant
sum of funds channeled to political campaigns, there seems to be no consensus among social
scientists as to the impact of this money on political outcomes.41 For example, Feldman and
Jondrow (1984), Ragsdale and Cook (1987), and Levitt (1994) find no statistically significant
effect of incumbent spending on outcomes - and perhaps even a negative effect - whereas
Abramowitz (1988), Grier (1989), Moon (2006), and da Silveira and de Mello (2011) find a
positive and statistically significant effect. Furthermore, most of this literature is unable to
capture the heterogeneity of campaign spending effects across candidates. In this chapter, I
propose a new empirical framework that explicitly models the heterogeneity in the use and
effect of campaign funds. To this end, I use a model of campaigning that allows funds to be
∗This chapter is co-authored with Ekim Cem Muyan.
41See, for example, Stratmann (2005)
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spent on different campaign strategies, which may affect election outcomes differentially. I
argue that an understanding of the impact of campaign funds on elections is possible only
when the heterogeneous effects of campaigning strategies is uncovered.
This approach enables us to investigate campaigning strategies employed by the candidates
running for political office. In particular, I model and analyze the campaign tone (positivity
or negativity) a candidate uses. In fact, understanding campaign strategies is of interest
in and of itself. Evidence suggests that campaigns have become increasingly negative in
tone since 2000. For instance, Fowler and Ridout (2013) point out that in the 2000 presi-
dential election, approximately 60% of ads were negative.42 In 2012, approximately 85% of
the total ads were negative. This rapid increase in negativity has sparked wide and often
critical commentary of such advertisements.43 The particular channel I investigate is built
on the anecdotal and empirical evidence that suggests negative advertising may discourage
voter turnout. For instance, it is widely believed that heavy negative campaigning between
the two major party candidates in the 2000 Minnesota Gubernatorial elections depressed
their turnout, which opened the door for the third-party candidate Jesse Ventura to win
the election.44 There is also some concern that negative campaigning may contribute to
polarization or voter fatigue.45 This feature of campaign strategy is often overlooked in the
empirical literature.46 The political science literature has often found that not only does
negative advertising differ from positive advertising in its overall effects on voters, but also
the effects vary across different groups of potential voters.47 For instance, negative adver-
tising may have a demobilizing effect on ideological voters, while positive advertising may
42Negativity is measured as attack or contrasting advertising, which is typical in the political science
literature.
43See, for instance, Washington Post, Feb. 20, 2012, “Study: Negative Campaign Ads Much More Fre-
quent, Vicious Than In Primaries Past.”
44See, for example, Lentz (2001).
45See, for instance, Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino (1994), which in an experimental set-
ting found evidence that negative advertisements “weakened confidence in the responsiveness of electoral
institutions and public officials. As campaigns become more negative and cynical, so does the electorate.”
46Often, any notion of strategy besides overall spending is overlooked. Three important exceptions are
Stromberg (2008), which looks at presidential campaign stops, Nalebuff and Shachar (1999), which investi-
gates the exertion of candidates’ effort to increase participation, and Gordon and Hartmann (2013a), which
analyzes the optimal allocation of advertising across states under the Electoral College. Even among these
cases, none includes a choice of overall negativity of the campaign.
47See, for example, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1997), and several others discussed in section 2.4.1.
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be more effective in attracting swing voters. To the extent that optimal campaign strategies
differ systematically across different types of candidates and elections, it is important to
understand the differential impact negativity can have on voting outcomes.
This chapter builds on the argument that campaign finance and strategies are heavily
interrelated, and therefore should be analyzed together. To understand the true impact
of a dollar on election outcomes, one must understand how that dollar will be spent in a
campaign. This is because elections differ in terms of their fundamentals, which ultimately
determine how effective the campaign strategies employed will be. Thus, the effect of
campaign funds depends on the effectiveness of the strategy that will be used in equilibrium,
which will vary across candidates and elections. Unless one understands how funds will be
allocated among different strategies, one cannot be able to uncover their true impact on
the outcomes of elections. In addition, the campaign strategies chosen depend on the
available funds to the candidate and to his opponent. For example, a candidate might
be more likely to engage in negative campaigning when both he and his opponent have
large budgets, but may tend to be more positive when he has a large money advantage.
Hence, approaching these two questions in isolation could result in misleading answers. The
theoretical and empirical strategy tries to avoid this by focusing on this very important
interplay of campaign funds and strategies.
To this end, I develop a model featuring a game between candidates that decide their cam-
paign strategies. In particular, candidates decide on how to allocate their total budgets
between positive and negative campaigning. I denote a candidate’s campaigning that in-
cludes information only about himself as a positive one. On the other hand, when the
campaigning includes information about the opponent, it is a negative one.48 Each con-
stituency has three types of voters: the base (ideological) voters for each candidate and
swing voters. I assume that negative campaigning is a demobilizing tool: it demobilizes the
supporters of the opponent at the expense of possibly alienating some of the candidate’s
own. On the other hand, positive campaigning is used to attract swing voters to vote in
48This categorization is the norm in the literature when measuring negative advertising.
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favor of the candidate. More precisely, I assume that ideological voters decide only on their
turnout. When they do, they vote for the specific candidate they support. Swing voters, on
the other hand, always turnout to vote, but decide on whom to vote based on the (positive)
campaigns of the candidates. Hence, in the model, a candidate campaigns negatively to
reduce the turnout of the opponent’s supporters at the cost of decreasing his own. Positive
campaigning, on the other hand, increase the portion of swing voters who vote for her.
Elections differ from each other in the measure of voter groups. The measure of ideological
voters for each candidate, and hence swing voters, vary across elections, which result in
different equilibrium campaigning strategies for each election. In the empirical specification,
these levels of support are drawn from a distribution depending on the election-specific
observables. These draws are observed by the candidates while they are unobservable to the
econometrician. Given initial support, candidates choose their allocations simultaneously,
after which the election takes place and the winners are realized.
To infer the overall campaign strategy of the candidates, I use data from from the Wis-
consin Political Advertisement project that records each television advertisement aired by
a candidate. This dataset also records the tone of the advertisement. Hence, I assume
that the TV campaigning strategy is representative of the overall strategy of the player.
Moreover, to estimate the distribution of voters, I use data from the American National
Election Study. I calibrate the model to match patterns of campaign tone observed in the
data, and then use the calibrated model to understand the effects of spending and strategies
on voting outcomes.
To see why a model is necessary to understand the impact of campaign funds and strategies,
consider the following. Negativity may be a useful strategy for candidates who are trailing,
as it may lead the base of supporters of a front-runner to shrink. Conversely, positive
campaigning may be relatively more effective for a front-runner. This is in line with the
observation in the data that incumbents tend to be much more positive than challengers.
However, if one uses ex-post vote measures to try and infer the effectiveness of advertising,
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one would tend to see negativity correlated with low vote shares and thereby conclude
negative advertising is ineffective. Note that this goes beyond purely incumbent-challenger
races, as even in open seat elections, ex-post vote margin is negatively correlated with
campaigning negativity. Controlling for the endogenous decision of campaign negativity
with respect to things like initial voter support is important in understanding the overall
effectiveness of different campaign strategies.
The calibrated model suggests that campaign spending is relatively ineffective at increasing
vote shares. For the average election, which has budgets of about $2.4 million, a 10%
increase in one candidate’s budget increases his expected vote differential by about 0.4
percentage points. This is roughly in line with results from Levitt (1994), among others.
To understand the differential impact of campaign spending, I perform multiple exercises.
For example, consider an election where the candidates have the same measure of supporters.
When these candidates have no funds to campaign, they are expected to tie in the election.
Now consider providing one candidate with a $2.1 million budget while the other $700,000
(which are approximately the 75th and 25th percentile of observed budgets, respectively).
This yields a 2.5 percentage point improvement in the expected vote of the first candidate.
While not insignificant in absolute terms, a $1.4 million advantage is approximately the
same size as the median budget. Thus, 2.5 percentage points is arguably a relatively minor
increases for such a sizable budget advantage. I employ other calculations to find that,
albeit small, trailing candidates benefit from extra funds more than the leading ones. The
model also implies that negative campaigning is relatively effective for candidates who face
an opponent with a high level of initial support, while positive campaigning is relatively
effective for candidates in elections where neither side has a particularly high initial support.
Still, the differences in effectiveness are not large, especially given that overall effectiveness
is low. Finally, the model implies slightly decreasing returns to spending. Both this feature
and the relative effectiveness of negative campaigning for trailing candidates may explain
why the previous literature tends to find challenger spending is relatively more effective
than incumbent spending.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related literature
while section 2.3 focuses on the underlying institutional framework. Section 2.4 describes
the model and the proof of the existence of a unique equilibrium. Section 2.5 discusses the
data, and section 2.6 describes the calibration of the model. Finally, section 2.7 provides
the description and results from model simulations, and section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
The key feature of the model is the candidate’s decision of how to allocate his budget between
positive and negative campaigning. Several theoretical papers focus on this decision. One of
the earliest examples is Harrington and Hess (1996), which studies negative campaigning in
a spatial framework. In their model, the negativity of a campaign depends primarily on the
personal attributes of the candidate. Later works focus on the signaling game associated
with advertising when candidate qualifications are unknown to voters (see Bhattacharya
(2012) and Hao and Li (2013), for instance).
For tractability, I abstract from the spatial framework and the signaling aspect of political
advertising and focus on the direct effect by using an “influence function” (Bhattacharya
2012) that affects voter support for each candidate. The theoretical framework I utilize
for the campaign stage of the model is similar to Skaperdas and Grofman (1995). They
model a two-candidate competition where each candidate decides on positive and negative
campaigning levels given fixed and equal budgets. Negative campaigning by a candidate de-
presses turnout (for both his own and his opponent’s supporters) while positive campaigning
influences undecided voters. Through this setup, they argue that they can broadly match
some regularities of political competition - namely, that the front-runner chooses more posi-
tive advertising than his opponent and that negative campaigning is greater the stronger his
opponent’s support. I differ from their analysis in allowing for the possibility of asymmetric
budgets and decreasing returns to negative campaigning. More importantly, there is no em-
pirical component to their analysis, whereas I calibrate the model to match campaign tone
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data, allowing for rich heterogeneity in budget, advertising, and district-specific data.
In addition to theoretical work, there have been several structural models studying the
determinants and effects of political advertising and campaigning. Gordon and Hartmann
(2013a) focuses on the allocation of television advertising across markets in presidential
elections. They use a BLP-type setup to understand how the Electoral College system
distorts advertising decisions relative to a popular vote system. Shachar (2009) attempts
to explain the finding from Nalebuff and Shachar (1999) that participation rates in U.S.
presidential elections tend to be higher in states with narrower expected margins of victory.
The author models campaign marketing activities in a two-candidate contest and estimates
the model, finding that candidates advertise more in close states, which can drive higher
turnout. Stromberg (2008) also estimates a model of the allocation of resources in U.S.
presidential candidates under the Electoral College, with a focus on campaign visits rather
than advertising.
Previous structural work surrounding campaign strategies differs from ours in several re-
spects. To my knowledge, none differentiates between positive and negative campaigning,
which previous empirical work has shown affect turnout and election outcomes in distinct
ways.49 Furthermore, most analyses use U.S. presidential election data and rules, in partic-
ular the Electoral College, whereas I use Senate and House elections with plurality voting
systems. The focus in the campaign stage of the model is to understand the overall and
relative effectiveness of positive and negative campaigning in winning elections, not on the
allocation induced by electoral rules.
More broadly, the model sheds light on the overall impact of spending on elections. A few
previous attempts have been made to estimate the overall impact of campaign spending on
election outcomes. Palda and Palda (1998) uses regression analysis of French election data
and finds a very small effect of campaign spending on vote shares. Levitt (1994) uses races
with the same two candidates to estimate the effect of spending on outcomes and finds little
to no effect, as well. However, Stratmann (2009) utilizes the same methodology but analyzes
49See, for instance, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1997)
68
the effect of television advertising on vote shares, finding a significant impact. Additionally,
da Silveira and de Mello (2011) uses a quasi-natural experiment in Brazil due to the two-
round voting system and a rule that allocates TV advertising exogenously and differently
in the first and second rounds. The authors find a large causal effect of TV advertising on
election outcomes. Finally, in one of the few examples of structural analysis of campaign
finance, Kawai and Sunada (2015) models fund-raising and spending in House elections. The
authors find a relatively small effect of spending on election outcomes, slightly larger than
that of Levitt (1994). For other examples, Stratmann (2005) provides a thorough review
of the literature. While these works shed light on the impact of campaign contributions
and spending, I focus on the effectiveness of different campaign strategies, namely negative
versus positive campaigning, which can help to explain the relative difference in effectiveness
for challengers and incumbents, for example.
2.3 Legal Background
In the analysis, an important component of the model is the receipts of political cam-
paigns, taken as exogenous. Therefore, it is important to note some of the legal background
surrounding campaign finance laws. While there were some changes to such laws within
the sample, the regulations regarding political action committees (PAC)50 and individual
contributions did remain constant over this period. The limits on PAC contributions to
candidates is the same throughout the sample. Most changes due to the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act in 2002 involved the use of “soft money” (i.e. nonfederal funds subject
to less regulation prior to the reform) and independent expenditures. Both soft money and
independent expenditures deal with spending by parties and outside groups, not by the
candidates. In the model, I focus only on spending by candidates, so these changes are
generally not directly relevant for the type of campaign spending I consider. While outside
50Political action committees are groups “organized for the purpose of raising and spending money to
elect and defeat candidates.” They are an important component of campaign contributions, and face a legal
limit on how much they can contribute in each cycle to each candidate.
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spending may affect voters and therefore act as well, it is also important to note that within
the sample, outside spending is a relatively minor part of aggregate federal campaign spend-
ing. For instance, in 2008, total spending in all federal races was approximately $5.3 billion,
while outside spending comprised only about 6% of this.51 In 2004, outside spending was
only about 4.7% of total federal election spending, and in 2000 the number was 1.8%. Thus,
outside spending did not play a quantitatively significant role .
In a similar vein, I also do not consider the emergence of super PACs. This is because the
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission Supreme Court decision, which allowed
for the existence of such organizations, occurred in 2010. Super PACs can engage in an
unlimited amount of spending so long as their expenditures are made independently from
campaigns. Since my sample ends in 2008, super PACs do not affect the analysis.
In addition to laws regarding campaign contributions, it is also important to understand
the protocol for campaign advertising. Television advertisements in the model are how
I measure campaign strategies. In the United States, the main regulation on television
advertisements is that stations and cable networks must “treat legally qualified candidates
equally in allocating airtime.” That is, if a station provides airtime to one candidate, it
must offer “the same amount of airtime with the same audience size to all other candidates
at the same rate,” though if the other candidates cannot afford this airtime the network
is under no obligation to provide it at a lower price (Karanicolas 2012). Thus, conditional
on both candidates having sufficient funds, this effectively guarantees symmetry in access
for each candidate in a given election. There is also a “reasonable access” rule that ensures
availability of advertising time to all candidates at the rates paid by their most favored
advertisers. This also implies that rationing of advertising spots will not occur in most
cases. Overall, the legal rules regarding television advertising govern the setup of the model
for political campaigns.
51This data is from Opensecrets.org, which extracts data from FEC filings. It does not accurately break
down total outside spending by race type due to limitations in how the reports are filed. This is why I only
list total federal election spending, which includes the presidential race in each year.
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2.4 Model
I consider a model of campaigning in which there are two candidates competing for votes
in an election. There are E elections held in the sample, with one Democratic and one
Republican candidate in each election. Each candidate is endowed with a budget consisting
of individual and PAC contributions, which is common knowledge among the candidates.
Given these budgets, candidates allocate their funds between negative and positive adver-
tising to maximize their expected vote shares. Given the chosen strategies, expected vote
shares for each candidate i ∈ {1, 2} are realized as a function of campaign strategies. Finally,
an election-day shock that is orthogonal to information at the time campaigning decisions
are made is realized, and a winner is determined.
More specifically, the model of the campaign game between candidates is similar to Skaper-
das and Grofman (1995), although I deviate from it considerably. There are two candidates
i ∈ {1, 2} in every election. For each election, there is a population of unit mass of potential
voters. Within each of these populations, a share ri ∈ [0, 1] initially supports candidate
i ∈ {1, 2}, which I sometimes denote as ideological voters. These shares are restricted to be
such that r1 + r2 ≤ 1. The remaining share R = 1 − r1 − r2 are considered swing voters.
These shares are known to candidates prior to their campaigning decisions.
Candidate i is endowed with budget Bi, comprised of all political contributions. Candidates
simultaneously select the share of their budget to spend on positive or negative campaigning.
I assume that different campaign strategies have differential effects on each group of voters.
Negativity by candidate i primarily demobilizes his opponents’ initial supporters, though
they may also have the cost of demobilizing his own support, as well. These demobilized
supporters do not turnout to vote. Positivity attracts swing voters. More precisely, a larger
level of positivity by candidate i will attract a larger share of the R mass of swing voters,
all else equal. In this sense, positivity assumed to be persuasive to swing voters.
Formally, let xi denote candidate i’s level of negative spending and yi denote his positive
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spending level. Given (y1, y2), candidate i will receive share q
i(y1, y2) ≡ (1+yi)
1/γ
(1+y1)1/γ+(1+y2)1/γ
of the total mass R of swing voters, where γ ≥ 1 is a parameter. These functions have the
property that qi(y1, y2) is increasing and concave in yi, and decreasing and convex in yj
for j 6= i. Furthermore, they assume that if neither side chooses any positive campaigning,
swing voters will split evenly among the two candidates. Note that the smaller γ is, the
more effective positive campaigning is in gaining swing voter support.
For negative campaigning levels (x1, x2), the total shares of support retained by candidates
1 and 2 are given by:
exp{−α1x1 − α2x2} for candidate 1
exp{−α1x2 − α2x1} for candidate 2
respectively, with parameters α1 ≥ 0 and α2 > α1. That is, α1 captures the idea that
negative campaigning by a candidate will demobilize part of his own base, whereas α2
reflects that negativity will demobilize part of his opponent’s base.
Therefore, given campaigning choices (x1, x2, y1, y2), the expected share of support for can-
didate i ∈ {1, 2} (with j 6= i) is:
V i(xi, yi;xj , yj) = riexp{−α1xi − α2xj}+R
(
(1 + yi)
1/γ
(1 + yi)1/γ + (1 + yj)1/γ
)
.
The final component determining vote shares is a mean zero random shock ε with CDFH(ε).
I assume ε has full support. This is an exogenous popularity shock that is unknown to the
candidates when they make their campaigning decisions. It encompasses all uncertainty
that is realized on election day, and is orthogonal to information the candidates have at the
time they make their campaigning decisions. A given ε > 0 corresponds to a net gain in
support for candidate 2, while ε < 0 corresponds to a net gain in support for candidate 1.
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Therefore, candidate 1 wins if:
V 1(x1, y1;x2, y2)− V 2(x2, y2;x1, y1) ≥ ε
which happens with probability:
H(V 1(x1, y1;x2, y2)− V 2(x2, y2;x1, y1))
The that probability that candidate 2 wins is thus:
1−H(V 1(x1, y1;x2, y2)− V 2(x2, y2;x1, y1))
Given that H(·) is strictly increasing, the objective function is the expected vote share,
V 1(x1, y1;x2, y2) − V 2(x2, y2;x1, y1). Taking as given budgets, his opponent’s spending
decisions, and initial support, the problem of candidate 1 is:
max
x1,y1
r1 exp{−α1x1 − α2x2}+R
(
(1 + y1)
1/γ
(1 + y1)1/γ + (1 + y2)1/γ
)
− r2 exp{−α1x2 − α2x1} −R
(
(1 + y2)
1/γ
(1 + y1)1/γ + (1 + y2)1/γ
)
s.t. x1 + y1 ≤ B1 and x1, y1 ≥ 0
(16)
Since the objective function is strictly increasing in both x1 and y1, the budget constraint
binds with equality at the optimum.52 Hence, I can rewrite the objective of the first
52I abstract from the savings/borrowing decision of the candidates across election cycles. In the sample,
the median savings as a percentage of total receipts for Democrats, conditional on saving, is 1.3%, while for
Republicans it is 1.4%. The median borrowing as a percentage of total receipts for Democrats, conditional
on borrowing, is 2.1%, while for Republicans it is 4.4%.
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candidate as:
max
x1
r1 exp{−α1x1 − α2x2} − r2 exp{−α1x2 − α2x1}+
R
(
(1 +B1 − x1)1/γ − (1 +B2 − x2)1/γ
(1 +B1 − x1)1/γ + (1 +B2 − x2)1/γ
)
s.t. x1 ∈ [0, B1]
(17)
The problem of candidate 2 is analogous.
A strategy for candidate i is a function xi, which maps budgets and initial support levels
to a negative campaigning proportion.53 Formally, a strategy of candidate i therefore xi :
R2+ ×42 → [0, 1]. That is, given budgets B1 and B2, and initial support levels r1, r2, and
R = 1 − r1 − r2, xi(B1, B2, r1, r2, R) giving negativity as a proportion of total budget for
candidate i.
The definition of equilibrium of the campaign game for a given election is as follows:
Definition 1. Given initial support (r1, r2, R), and budgets (B1, B2), an equilibrium of this
game is a pair of functions (xˆ1(B1, B2, r1, r2, R), xˆ2(B1, B2, r1, r2, R)) that give negative
campaigning proportions for each candidate, such that for each level of initial support and
budgets, xˆ1(B1, B2, r1, r2, R) solves candidate 1’s problem given xˆ2(B1, B2, r1, r2, R), and
vice-versa.
2.4.1 Discussion of the Theoretical Setting
In order to make the model tractable for the empirical application, I have imposed some
assumptions on the effect each type of campaigning has on voters. In this section I discuss
some empirical work that supports these assumptions, as well as the potential shortcomings
of the approach.
As described previously, positivity and negativity in the model differ in their effect on dif-
53Note that here I denote the strategy as a proportion of the total budget. This will ease notation in the
calibration section, but obviously is simply a normalization since xiBi gives the level of negative spending.
Also, trivially if Bi = 0, then I denote xi as 0.
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ferent types of voters. Negative campaigning suppresses turnout among ideological types,
while positive campaigning affects which candidate a swing voter prefers, but not her de-
cision to turn out. One piece of anecdotal evidence on how negative campaigning can
suppress turnout is from the 1998 gubernatorial elections in Minnesota, as described in
the introduction. There is also empirical research that suggests negative campaigning can
reduce turnout. One of the earliest studies documenting the effect of negative advertising
on turnout is Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino (1994). In an experimental
setting, the authors find a strong demobilization effect from negative advertising - exposure
to negative ads decreased intentions to vote by 5%. They further support these findings
using aggregate level data in a follow-up paper, Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon (1999).
Recent work by Krupnikov (2011) also supports the potential demobilizing effect of negative
advertisements on supporters of the advertisement’s target. Note that while there are other
studies that argue that negative advertising may not demobilize as much as Ansolabehere,
Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino (1994) claim (see, for instance, Finkel and Geer (1998), Ash-
worth and Clinton (2006), and Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner (2007)), the model does allow
for demobilizing effects of negative campaigning to be arbitrarily small.
Furthermore, negative campaigning in the model not only suppresses turnout for the target
candidate, but may also demobilize supporters the sponsoring candidate. This has been
referred to as the “boomerang” effect in the literature. Garramone (1985) provides some
of the earliest evidence for this effect, as well as the general demobilizing effect of negative
campaigning. Fridkin and Kenney (2004) and Fridkin and Kenney (2011) also find that
negative advertisements can depress evaluations of the target and the sponsor. However,
Krupnikov (2011) argues that negative advertising may not have a demobilizing effect on
supporters of the advertisement’s sponsor. In calibration, I do not restrict the “boomerang”
effect to be strictly positive.
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2.4.2 Theoretical Results
In this section I present results from the theoretical model. Proofs of the relevant propo-
sitions and lemmas are in Appendix 2.9.1. The main result is that an equilibrium of the
campaign game exists. To ease exposition, I define the following functions for i ∈ {1, 2}
and i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}:
MBin(x1, x2) = rjα2exp{−α1xj − α2xi} − riα1exp{−α1xi − α2xj} (18)
MBip(x1, x2) =
2R
γ
[
(1 +Bi − xi)1/γ−1(1 +Bj − xj)1/γ
((1 +Bi − xi)1/γ + (1 +Bj − xj)1/γ)2
]
. (19)
MBin(x1, x2) is the marginal benefit of negative campaigning for candidate i computed at
campaigning levels (x1, x2). MB
i
p(x1, x2) is similarly defined to be the marginal benefit from
positive campaigning for i. These equations are trivially obtained by taking the first-order
conditions of the objective functions.
The following statements are useful in proving the existence of the equilibrium.
Proposition 1. In the campaign stage of the model, the following statements are true:
1. If MBin(x1, x2) > 0, then
∂MBin(xj)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
(x1,x2)
< 0.
2.
∂MBip
∂xi
> 0.
3.
∂MBin(x1, x2)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
(x1,x2)
< 0 if and only if
∂MBjn(x1, x2)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
(x1,x2)
> 0 and vice versa.
4.
∂MBip(x1, x2)
∂xj
∣∣∣∣
(x1,x2)
< 0 if and only if
∂MBjp(x1, x2)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
(x1,x2)
> 0 and vice versa.
Item one of Proposition 1 state that the marginal benefit of campaigning is decreasing
whenever it is positive. The first two items of Proposition 1 state that the marginal returns
to both negative and positive campaigning are decreasing in the relevant range. This, as
I show in the next lemma, will imply that the best response of the candidates will be
singletons. Note that it is also trivial that if MBin(0, x2) < 0, then MB
i
n(x1, x2) ≤ 0 for all
x1 ∈ [0, B1]. If there was any x that violated this, it would be a contradiction to the fact
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that MBin is continuous since it would have to discretely jump from 0 to a positive value
by the first item in Proposition 1.
The last two items state that when negative (or positive) campaigning is locally a strategic
substitute for one candidate, it is complementary for the other. This only holds locally, and
suffices to provide us with uniqueness. In the next lemma, I show that the best responses
are functions.
Leamma 3. The best response correspondence for each player, BRi(xj), is singleton, i.e.
BRi : [0, Bj ]→ [0, Bi] is a function. Moreover, BRi(xj) is continuous in xj.
With these two previous results, I now prove existence of an equilibrium in the campaign
stage of the model.
Theorem 1. An equilibrium of the campaign game exists.
For the remainder of the chapter, in each election I denote the Democrat as candidate 1
and the Republican as candidate 2.
2.4.3 Empirical model
To add flexibility to the model in matching the data, I introduce heterogeneity that is
unobservable to the econometrician, but observable by both candidates prior to deciding
their allocations. Given parameters and budgets, the levels of initial support (r1, r2, R)
pin down the optimal campaigning decisions. While I observe some information regarding
the levels of initial support in each district or state (e.g. demographics, surveys on party
support, etc.), I do not have complete information on these variables. Thus, I assume
that while I can observe the mean levels of initial support for each election conditional on
parameters, only the candidates observe the specific realization of support.54
More specifically, let Z denote the demographic characteristics of the district or state in
which a given election is held. I assume that the initial levels of support are drawn from
54There are very few elections in the original sample that feature a prominent third-party candidate, so I
do not include these in the final sample.
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a Dirichlet distribution,55 but the exact draws are observed only by the candidates. That
is, the random draw of initial supports (r˜1, r˜2, R˜) ∼ Dir(kr1, kr2, kR), where Dir(·) is
the three-parameter Dirichlet distribution, ri = ri(Z) + ψsSi + ψdemDi + ψincInci for i ∈
{1, 2}, and R = 1− r1 − r2. The functions r1(Z) and r2(Z) are known functions mapping
demographics to initial support. The construction of this functions is discussed in section
2.5. k is a parameter that does not affect the mean, but is inversely related to the variance
of the distribution.56 Parameters ψs, ψdem, and ψinc shift the mean of the distribution.
Di is an indicator taking a value of 1 if candidate i in election e is a Democrat and 0
otherwise,57 and Inci is an indicator taking a value of 1 if candidate i is an incumbent,
0 if neither candidate is an incumbent (i.e. it is an open seat election), and -1 if his
opponent is an incumbent.58 Finally, Si is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if
candidate i is skilled and 0 otherwise. I assume that candidates observe both his own and
his opponent’s skill realizations, but the econometrician does not. I further assume Si is
Bernoulli distributed with:
Pr{Si = 1} = exp{βc}
1 + exp{βc} .
59 (20)
55The Dirichlet distribution has support in the 2-dimensional simplex, making it ideal for initial support
draws, since (r1, r2, R) necessarily must be in the 2-dimensional simplex.
56If (x1, x2, x3) ∼ Dir(kα1, kα2, kα3) with ∑3i=1 αi = 1, then V ar(xi) = αi(∑j 6=i αj)k+1 , while E[xi] = αi.
Therefore, the variance of xi is decreasing in k, but the mean is unaffected by changes in k.
57I allow for a shift in initial support for Democrats (i.e. ψdem) due to the fact that the measurement of
Democratic support r1(Z) is systematically lower than that of Republican’s. While this may be an accurate
measurement of initial support, there may also be systematic undermeasurement of Democratic support.
Including ψdem allows us to control for this possibility.
58Note that this particular structure assumes that if a candidate is an incumbent, the boost in his initial
support ψinc is taken from what would be his opponent’s initial support, all else equal. Results are robust
to assuming that the shift in support comes from swing voters, i.e. Inci = 1 if i is an incumbent and 0
otherwise.
59This functional form is strictly to keep the probability of being skilled between zero and one.
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Given a realization of initial support (r̂1, r̂2, R̂) and candidates’ budgets, i’s problem is:
max
xi
r̂iexp{−α1xi − α2xj} − r̂jexp{−α1xj − α2xi}
+ R̂
(
(1 +Bi − xi)1/γ − (1 +Bj − xj)1/γ
(1 +Bi − xi)1/γ + (1 +Bj − xj)1/γ
)
s.t. xi ∈ [0, Bi]
(21)
Since I assume the candidates observe (r̂1, r̂2, R̂), there is no change in the information set
of the players, and therefore the existence and uniqueness follows. The distribution of initial
support will generate a distribution of negative campaigning for each candidate, and thus
will generate a likelihood function.
2.5 Data
I implement the model by using data from 2000, 2004, and 2008 House of Representatives
and Senate races. In order to infer campaign strategies, I use data on political advertising
tone from the Wisconsin Advertising Project. I merge this data with contribution data
from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME), individual level
opinion data from American National Election Studies (ANES), publicly available House
and Senate election results, and demographic data from the 2000 Census and the American
Community Survey (ACS).60 I also hand collect some relevant data, such as incumbency
status, for each race.
2.5.1 Advertising and Elections
WiscAds uses a technology that monitors the transmission of 35 national networks in the
top Designated Market Areas (DMA). A DMA is a geographical region where individuals
60These data are gathered from Bonica (2013), Goldstein, Franz, and Ridout (2002), Goldstein and Rivlin
(2007), Goldstein and Rivlin (2011), University of Michigan (2000), University of Michigan (2004), Univer-
sity of Michigan (2008), and U.S. Census Bureau (2002).
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receive the same TV content and it is the smallest geographical unit in which a politician
can buy air time. Every time there is a political advertisement in these markets, WiscAds
captures it. A team of students research assistants then analyzes the storyboard of the
advertisement to code it into the dataset. I therefore have detailed information on each
advertisement: tone (i.e. whether it is positive or negative), exact date and time, station,
and ad sponsor, among other things. It also importantly includes the candidate, party, or
group for which the ad was aired in support. The dataset also contains an estimated cost
variable. There are three ad tone types in the data: positive, contrast, and attack. I follow
the convention in the literature and define negative ads as those classified as either contrast
or attack ads.
The sample is limited to the geographical borders of WiscAds for each year. I merge the
counties covered by WiscAds with the counties in each district.61 Over the span of the three
election cycles I consider, WiscAds should in principle cover 1,390 races. However, none
of the candidates running in 814 of these elections purchased airtime and hence are not in
the WiscAds dataset.62 I therefore have no information on the campaign strategies of the
candidates in those 814 elections. I also drop the 20 elections in which ads were purchased
that were held in Louisiana, since this state employs a runoff system, and the 23 elections
where a third-party candidate was a winner or a runner-up due to the method by which I
estimate the supporters of each candidate. Finally, I drop 183 elections for which at least
one candidate received positive contributions, but did not advertise, since I have no way
to infer overall campaign strategies without observing advertisements. This leaves us with
361 elections over the three cycles.
Details of the type of elections covered in the final sample are given in Table 6. I have
between 20 and 23 Senate elections for each year, and about 85 House elections for 2000
and 2004. For 2008, there are 126 elections included. Among the 814 elections in which
neither candidate had a television advertisement, 758 were House elections. Since these
61I do not observe this directly from WiscAds. I obtained the list of counties in each DMA and year from
SRDS (2000, 2004, 2008).
62Among these elections, 56 are Senate and 758 are House races.
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Table 6
Sample Elections by Race Type and Year
YEAR RACES
Senate House
2000 23 82
2004 20 90
2008 20 126
Total 63 298
elections tend to be less competitive, advertising in general is less common. Hence, I
observe a large fraction of the House elections where at least one candidate purchased TV
ads. Within the final sample, I have 200 Republican wins versus 161 Democrat wins. The
average winning margin for both parties is almost 18%. The summary of election results
is available in Table 7. Table 8 shows the distribution of incumbency status in the sample.
There are 16 elections for an open seat in the Senate and 61 in the House. The remaining
47 Senate races and 237 House races involve an incumbent. Given that the sample period
covers a relatively successful period for Republicans, there are 180 races with a Republican
incumbent, and 104 with a Democratic incumbent.
Table 7
Election Data - All Years
Democrats Republicans
Winning Margin 17.75 17.82
(14.87) (11.61)
Winner 161 200
Total Races 361
Table 8
Incumbency Status
TYPE RACES
Senate House
Open Seat 16 61
Democrat Incumbent 19 85
Republican Incumbent 28 152
Total 63 298
In 2000, WiscAds followed only the top 75 DMAs, in 2004 the top 100 DMAs, and in 2008
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all of the 210 DMAs, hence why the 2008 sample includes more races than previous years.
Note that in each case, the DMAs cover a very large portion of the U.S. population: in
2000, the top 75 DMAs accounted for 78% of the population. In 2008, nearly the entire
population is covered. However, since the observed DMAs do not exactly cover the entire
U.S. population, I only partially observe the campaigns for some elections – that is, there are
some races where I observe political television advertisements only in some of the counties
within the district or state in which the election is held. To quantify the degree to which
this occurs, for each race, I compute the size of the population in the intersection of the
DMAs I observe and the Congressional district (for House races) or the state (for Senate
races) of the election, and divide by the district or state size. I find that, on average, the
dataset contains 91% of the population in a district or state. The boxplot for this measure
is displayed in Figure 16. For House races, the 75th percentile is above 90% whereas for the
Senate, it is around 53%. That is, for 75% of House races, at least 90% of the population is
in a DMAs I observe. The median coverage for Senate races is 93.5%, while for the House
it is 100%.
Figure 16
Party Support Boxplot
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Although the dataset covers a large portion of each race, the incompleteness of the data
could still be problematic for empirical implementation. The potential issue is the fact
that I expect the top DMAs to contain more populous urban areas which may be more
Democratic than the rest of the country. Hence, the areas I observe might have a Democratic
bias, which could potentially affect the strategies of the candidates. In carrying out the
empirical analysis, I assume that the candidate has the same campaign strategy across the
district.
To investigate the degree to which campaign strategies may differ across different popula-
tions, I analyze the variance in campaign strategy for elections in which advertising occurs
in more than one DMA. In particular, let ndi,e be the cost of all negative advertisements
aired in DMA d by candidate i in election e, and let tdi,e be the cost of all advertisements in
d aired by this candidate. I denote the campaign strategy in this DMA for candidate i in
election e as:
Ndi,e =
ndi,e
tdi,e
.
Letting Ni,e =
ni,e
ti,e
denote the campaign strategy for candidate i in election e across all
DMAs. Finally, I compute for each DMA the absolute deviation from the mean, |Ndi,e−Ni,e|.
Since air time is purchased in bulk, I consider campaigns that placed more than 500 ads
in at least two different DMAs. Among these campaigns, the median absolute deviation is
0.034 for Republicans and 0.021 for Democrats. The 75th percentile is 0.093 for Republicans
and 0.088 for Democrats. While there may be systematic differences between DMAs in the
sample and outside the sample, this evidence is suggestive of the idea that strategies do not
change dramatically across different populations.
2.5.2 Estimates of Initial Voter Support
An important determinant of the equilibrium of the model is the measure of the voter
types in each election, in particular (r1(Z), r2(Z), R(Z)), where Z is the distribution of
demographics in the district or state in which a given election is held in a given year.
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In order to estimate those parameters, I use the joint distribution of the demographic
characteristics for each district and state for the years 2000, 2004, and 2008. I construct
this data using the 2000 census and the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2005 and
2008.63 Due to data limitations I consider only race, gender, and income.
The next step is to estimate the probability an individual supports a party (or not) condi-
tional on demographic characteristics. I use the ANES survey data to estimate the probabil-
ity of identifying with a particular party conditional on demographic characteristics. In the
ANES, each surveyed individual is asked about his or her relevant demographic character-
istics of race, gender, and income. Furthermore, to identify party support, each individual
is asked the following question:
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat,
or an Independent? Would you call yourself a strong Democrat/Republican
or a not very strong Democrat/Republican? Do you think of yourself as
closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic party?
I consider an individual to be an ideological voter if he answers this question with a strong
partisan preference. The summary statistics for the ANES data are given in Tables 9, 10,
and 11 for years 2000, 2004, and 2008 respectively. These data are given for the entire
ANES samples, as well as broken down by party identification.
Table 9
ANES 2000 - Summary Statistics
(By party identification)
Overall Democrat Swing Republican
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Black 0.119 0.324 0.236 0.425 0.077 0.267 0.023 0.149
Female 0.551 0.498 0.603 0.490 0.538 0.499 0.499 0.501
LowInc 0.518 0.500 0.575 0.495 0.513 0.500 0.443 0.497
MidInc 0.412 0.492 0.378 0.485 0.430 0.496 0.427 0.495
HighInc 0.071 0.256 0.047 0.212 0.057 0.232 0.129 0.336
# of people 1577 552 635 390
Note: All variables dummies. LowInc is [0, 50K], MidInc is [50K, 75K], HighInc is [75K,∞)
63I use the 2005 ACS for the 2004 elections since there is no 2004 ACS. Also note that, for 2008, the ACS
is the three-year estimates, which allows analysis at a smaller geographic area.
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Table 10
ANES 2004 - Summary Statistics
(By party identification)
Overall Democrat Swing Republican
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Black 0.156 0.363 0.307 0.462 0.143 0.351 0.007 0.084
Female 0.516 0.500 0.607 0.489 0.463 0.499 0.486 0.501
LowInc 0.507 0.500 0.546 0.499 0.536 0.499 0.428 0.496
MidInc 0.404 0.491 0.396 0.490 0.385 0.487 0.438 0.497
HighInc 0.089 0.284 0.057 0.233 0.079 0.271 0.135 0.342
# of people 1577 552 635 390
Note: All variables dummies. LowInc is [0, 50K], MidInc is [50K, 75K], HighInc is [75K,∞)
Table 11
ANES 2008 - Summary Statistics
(By party identification)
Overall Democrat Swing Republican
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Black 0.121 0.326 0.245 0.430 0.085 0.280 0.014 0.117
Female 0.545 0.498 0.620 0.486 0.488 0.500 0.535 0.499
LowInc 0.482 0.500 0.533 0.499 0.516 0.500 0.361 0.481
MidInc 0.401 0.490 0.403 0.491 0.392 0.488 0.414 0.493
HighInc 0.117 0.322 0.065 0.246 0.092 0.289 0.225 0.418
# of people 1577 552 635 390
Note: All variables dummies. LowInc is [0, 50K], MidInc is [50K, 75K], HighInc is [75K,∞)
I estimate the probability that an individual is an ideological voter for a specific party or
a swing voter using a multinomial logistic regression. I use the following variables in the
estimation. ID ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the party identification where 0 indicates that an individual is
a swing voter, 1 indicates that the individual is an ideological Democrat and 2 a Republican.
The explanatory variables for individual i in vector zi are (blacki, femalei, inc
0
i , inc
1
i , inc
2
i ).
The indicators inc0 = 1 if the individual’s income is less than $50,000, inc1 = 1 if the
individual’s income is between $50,000 and $75,000, and inc2 = 1 if the income is greater
than $75,000. Setting the base outcome as being a swing voter, I estimate the vector of
coefficients {βk}2k=1 and get the following probabilities for each individual:
Pr(ID = k|zi) = exp(βkzi)
1 +
∑2
i=1 exp(βkzi)
for k ∈ {1, 2} (22)
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and Pr(ID = 0|zi) = 1−Pr(ID = 1|zi)−Pr(ID = 2|zi). I separately estimate coefficients
for each year. These estimation results are given in Tables 12, 13, and 14 for years 2000,
2004, and 2008 respectively.
Table 12
Multinomial Logit Results - 2000
Democrat Republican
βD St. Dev βR St. Dev
constant -.51* .261 .281 .204
black 1.3*** .178 -1.22*** .38
female .03* .125 -.06 .136
0 < Inc < 50K -.075 .275 -.88*** .24
50K < Inc < 75K -.512 .275 -.79*** .240
Observations 1577
Psuedo R2 .0429
LR-χ2 145.06
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Base outcome is Independent.
Table 13
Multinomial Logit Results - 2004
Democrat Republican
βD St. Dev βR St. Dev
constant -.725 .289 .248 .234
black 1.03*** .186 -3.07*** .68
female .674*** .157 -.20 .159
0 < Inc < 50K -.125 .312 -.700** .266
50K < Inc < 75K -.064 .312 -.326 .212
Observations 1088
Psuedo R2 .0712
LR-χ2 169.26
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Base outcome is Independent.
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Table 14
Multinomial Logit Results - 2008
Democrat Republican
βD St. Dev βR St. Dev
constant -.808*** .191 .376 .148
black 1.25*** .151 -1.78*** .385
female .556*** .108 -.41*** .116
0 < Inc < 50K .08 .206 -1.350*** .266
50K < Inc < 75K .229 .191 -.891*** .170
Observations 2136
Psuedo R2 .0637
LR-χ2 294.75
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Base outcome is Independent.
Finally, let Z denote the empirical joint distribution of demographics in a given election.
Each element Zi is the probability a random individual in the district has set of demographic
characteristics i, where i is some combination of included characteristics. This distribution
estimated from the Census and the ACS for the relevant year. Let N = 12 denote the total
number of possible demographic groupings. Then, I define
rk(Z) =
N∑
i=1
Pr(ID = k|i)Zi (23)
for k ∈ {1, 2}. Lastly, R(Z) = 1 − r1(Z) − r2(Z) corresponds to swing voters in the
model. Details about this variable can be found in Table 15, while Figure 17 provides the
boxplot.
Table 15
Ideological Support for Parties - All Years
Democratic Support Republican Support
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
2000 0.291 0.030 0.342 0.025
2004 0.272 0.045 0.370 0.047
2008 0.259 0.038 0.385 0.037
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Figure 17
Estimated Party Support Boxplot
2.5.3 Candidate Budgets
I measure budgets as the total real receipts of a candidate over the campaign cycle.64 This
data comes from DIME, which extracts the receipts from Federal Election Commission fil-
ings. In the model, each candidate is endowed with a budget to allocate between positive
and negative spending. While I only observe positivity and negativity for television ad-
vertising, I use this to infer overall campaign strategy. As Gordon and Hartmann (2013b)
note, television advertising comprises the largest component of media spending for political
campaigns. Furthermore, for both parties, television ads generally constitute a consider-
able element of candidate budgets, as well. Table 16 shows the total receipts by party,
and the average proportion of budgets devoted to television ads in the sample is 46.0% for
64I note that, while in principle candidates can borrow or save campaign funds, in the sample saving and
borrowing constitute a small fraction of total receipts. Among campaigns whose receipts exceed disburse-
ments, the median savings rate, which is receipts−disbursements
receipts
, for Republicans is 1.3% and for Democrats
is 1.4%. Furthermore, among campaigns whose disbursements exceed receipts, the median savings rate for
Republicans is -2.2%, and for Democrats is -4.4%. Note also that since budgets may be spent on items
other than advertising, I am assuming that the tone of advertisements reflects the overall negativity of the
campaign.
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Democrats and 37.9% for Republicans. I therefore use receipts as the measure of candi-
date budgets and the breakdown of television advertising tone as the measure of campaign
strategy.
Table 16
Total Receipts by Party
Democrats Republicans
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Total receipts 2,633,155 5,193,242 2,582,212 3,646,026
Ads as % of receipts 46.0% 0.403 37.9% 0.327
Note: Totals in nominal U.S. dollars.
2.5.4 Summary Statistics
I now document several of the main summary statistics and regularities in the data. Table
17 breaks down the total advertisements and advertisement tone by party. Democratic
candidates placed, on average, 2,151 ads in a race, while Republicans placed about 1,963.
The average number of Democratic negative ads in a race is 1,465, while for Republican
candidates it is 1,274. On average, a Democratic (Republican) candidate’s negative ads
amount to 58.1% (54.6%) of his total ads. There is not a significant difference either in
the total number of ads aired or their average negativity across parties. I observe the same
pattern for the estimated costs, as seen in Table 18.
Table 17
Number of Ads and Ad Types by Party - All Years
Democrats Republicans
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Total Ads 2150.8 3440.3 1962.6 3467.3
Positive Ads 685.8 1052.7 688.9 1305.4
Contrast Ads 592.2 1092.1 443.0 925.7
Attack Ads 872.5 1979.1 830.6 1913.2
Negative Ads 1464.7 2893.3 1273.7 2536.4
% of Neg Ads 58.1% .361 54.6% .353
Note: “% Neg Ads” only for those with positive amount of advertising.
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Table 18
Ad Costs by Party
Democrats Republicans
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Total cost 1,165,178 1,920,977 1,050,046 1,745,814
Neg Ad cost 798,735 1,412,325 693,226 1,253,378
% cost of Neg Ads 58.1% .361 54.6% .353
Campaigns with no spending 18 13
Note: Totals in nominal U.S. dollars.
While the broad strategies of candidates do not vary significantly across parties, the strate-
gies do differ between incumbents and challengers, and in close races versus landslides.
Table 19 provides the total ads and ad types by incumbents and challengers, whereas Table
20 does the same for estimated costs. Incumbents, on average, place about 350 more adver-
tisements in each race and spend $250,000 more on television advertising than challengers.
This stark difference is caused in part by fewer funds received by challengers. Table 21
shows that incumbents in the sample receive on average $1.1 million more than challengers.
The data also show that incumbents allocate most of their air time to positive advertise-
ments: 38.8% of incumbents’ total advertising spending goes to negative ads, whereas for
challengers this number is 71.5%.
Table 19
Number of Ads and Ad Types by Incumbency - All Years
Incumbents Challengers
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Total Ads 2015.2 3545.9 1657.3 3353.7
Positive Ads 897.1 1433.2 348.0 682.3
Contrast Ads 368.2 840.3 536.9 1083.8
Attack Ads 749.5 2017.6 772.3 2035.6
Negative Ads 1117.7 2592.8 1309.2 2939.1
% of Neg Ads 38.6% .352 71.5% .306
Note: “% Neg Ads” only for those with positive amount of advertising.
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Table 20
Ad Costs by Incumbency
Incumbents Challengers
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Total cost 1,075,472 1,620,455 826,419 1,483,449
Neg Ad cost 609,754 1,187,704 662,548 1,280,989
% cost of Neg Ads 38.8% 0.354 71.5% 0.307
# in the data 284 284
# with no spending 0 30
Note: Totals in nominal U.S. dollars.
Table 21
Total Receipts by Incumbency
Incumbents Challengers
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Total receipts 2,830,316 3,535,365 1,733,865 2,720,863
Ads as % of receipts 34.3% 0.283 41.8% 0.380
Note: Totals in nominal U.S. dollars.
Next, I classify the elections according to the ex-post vote margins and analyze the differ-
ences in advertising choices and budgets. I consider an election to be close if the winning
margin is less than 5 percentage points and a blowout if the margin is larger than 20 per-
centage points. Then, I look at the difference between the sum of the total ads (Table 22),
money spent (Table 23), and receipts (Table 24) by both campaigns. In landslide elections,
of which there are 130 observations, the mean number of ads by both candidates is 1,475.
In the 61 close elections I observe, the mean number of ads is 8,385, around 5.5 times as
much as in landslides. Furthermore, campaigns tend to be much more negative in close
elections. Around 74% of all ads aired in such elections were negative, compared to 26.5%
in landslides. Similarly stark differences remain when comparing negativity in terms of
money spent. Finally, as expected, total receipts in close races are much larger than in
landslide elections, with around $8.1 million in the former as compared to $3.3 million in
the latter.
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Table 22
Number of Ads and Ad Types by Closeness of Election
Close (<5% margin) Landslide (>20% margin)
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Total Ads 8385.0 9148.0 1474.5 2185.3
Positive Ads 2252.5 2726.5 891.1 1352.1
Contrast Ads 2365.3 2787.3 303.6 682.8
Attack Ads 3767.2 4606.2 279.8 663.2
Negative Ads 6132.5 6720.3 583.5 1189.2
% of Neg Ads 74.3% 0.169 26.5% 0.285
Total Elections 61 130
Note: Totals are for both candidates in nominal U.S. dollars. “% of Neg Ads”
only for those who had positive amount of advertising.
Table 23
Ad Costs by Closeness of Election
Close (<5% margin) Landslide (>20% margin)
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Total cost 4,502,892 4,694,231 708,389 1,227,679
Neg Ad cost 3,387,087 3,402,736 262,022 566,929
% cost of Neg Ads 75.5% 0.171 24.9% 0.284
# in the data 61 130
Note: Totals are for both candidates in nominal U.S. dollars.
Table 24
Total Receipts by Closeness of Election
Close (<5% margin) Landslide (>20% margin)
Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev
Total receipts 8,114,928 10,921,429 3,331,386 5,090,576
Ads as % of receipts 65.7% 0.362 19.4% 0.190
# in the data 61 130
Note: Totals are for both candidates in nominal U.S. dollars.
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Another interesting feature of the data is the presence of corner solutions. There are many
elections where a candidate’s strategy is to fill his airtime solely with positive or negative
advertisements. Detailed information about this, broken down by the party, is given in
Table 25. In 176 of the elections, I observe both candidates allocating their air time to
both positive and negative ads. For the rest, there are either no ads by one politician, or at
least one candidate chooses a corner strategy. Table 26 breaks down the selected strategies
by incumbency (among those elections involving an incumbent). While 97 out of the 284
incumbents in the sample chose only positive ads, 70 challengers chose exclusively negative,
again reflecting the relative propensity of a challenger to campaign negatively. Only 16
incumbents went entirely negative, and only 20 challengers went entirely positive.
Table 25
Distribution of Ad Strategies by Party
Republicans
All positive Interior All Negative No Ads Total
D
em
o
cr
at
s
All positive 20 21 11 12 64
Interior 14 176 21 1 212
All negative 17 40 10 0 67
No Ads 17 1 0 0 18
Total 68 238 42 13 361
Table 26
Distribution of Ad Strategies by Incumbency
Challengers
All positive Interior All Negative No Ads Total
In
cu
m
b
en
ts
All positive 14 29 26 28 97
Interior 4 126 39 2 171
All negative 2 9 5 0 16
No Ads 0 0 0 0 0
Total 20 164 70 30 284
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2.6 Calibration and Fit
Given parameter values, for each election I can simulate draws from the initial support
distribution and solve for the campaigning equilibrium. The full set of parameters is:
Θ = {γ, α1, α2, βc, ψs, ψdem, ψinc, k}
To select parameters, I calibrate the model to roughly match the various conditional means
of negative campaigning, in particular in the aggregate and by party. I also roughly match
the distributions of observed campaigning strategies. In order to calibrate the model, first
consider how the various parameters differentially affect the observed distribution of out-
comes. First, as the parameter ψinc increases, we will tend to observe higher initial support
for incumbents and lower initial support for challengers. In turn, this will tend to gen-
erate more negativity from challengers and less negativity from incumbents. However, it
will not affect negativity in open seat races. The parameter ψdem has a similar effect,
except with a larger value of ψdem generating more negativity by Democrats and less by
Republicans.
Next, consider the parameters affecting the marginal productivity of negative and positive
campaigning, (α1, α2, γ). Note that a proportional increase in α1 and α2 tends to make
negative campaigning more productive. At first glance, it appears that γ could simultane-
ously be adjusted to keep the relative productivities of negativity and positivity the same,
and thus not change the equilibria. Given the structure of the game, changes in γ have a
differential effect on outcomes depending on the budget sizes. As an illustration, consider
elections in which only one candidate has a positive budget. Without loss of generality, let
candidate 1 have the positive budget. The mass of corner solutions at exclusively positive
campaigning in these elections is given by the measure of r˜1 and r˜2 such that the marginal
benefit of negative campaigning less than the marginal benefit of positive campaigning at
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x1 = 0:
Pr
{
r˜2 <
r˜1α1
α2
+
(1− r˜1 − r˜2)
2γα2
(1 +B1)
1/γ−1
(1 + (1 +B1)1/γ)2
}
.
Note that given the distribution of (r˜1, r˜2, R˜) is Dirichlet, which has full support on the
two-dimensional simplex, this mass will be strictly positive. In the data, I observe, even
among elections with only one positive budget, a wide range in values of B1 (or B2), as
well as variation in the estimates of r1(Ze), r2(Ze), and R(Ze), incumbency status. For
instance, for these elections the minimum budget is $269, 000 (in real 2000 dollars) while
the maximum is $3.3 million. The lowest budget is in the 6.7th percentile among all positive
budgets, while the highest is in the 85th percentile. Furthermore, r1(Ze) in elections with
one budget ranges from 0.123 to 0.218, while r2(Ze) ranges from 0.091 to 0.223. In the
full sample, r1(Ze) ranges between 0.123 and 0.282, while r2(Ze) ranges between 0.087 and
0.230.
Since the sample of one-budget elections features wide variation in B1 and demographics.
These elections will have the same probability distribution for initial support. Consider B1
approaching 0. The above mass of corner solutions in those elections is approximately
Pr
{
r˜2 <
r˜1α1
α2
+
1− r˜1 − r˜2
8γα2
}
.
Therefore, any other combination of parameters α1, α2, and γ that generate the same mass
should have α′1 = κα1, α′2 = κα2, and γ′ =
1
κγ.
Now consider a similar race but with a large budget B′1. The mass of corner solutions at
x1 = 0 in that election is given by
Pr
{
r˜2 <
r˜1α1
α2
+
1− r˜1 − r˜2
2γα2
(1 +B′1)1/γ−1
(1 + (1 +B′1)1/γ)2
}
Now, evaluated at the above defined α′1, α′2, and γ′, I have the new mass to be
Pr
{
r˜2 <
r˜1α1
α2
+
1− r˜1 − r˜2
2γα2
(1 +B′1)κ/γ−1
(1 + (1 +B′1)κ/γ)2
}
.
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The last term, reflecting the marginal benefit of positive campaigning evaluated at the
corner, is now more affected by the change in the γ parameter than in the low budget case,
and therefore the probability mass of corner solutions will be different. Therefore, changes
in the of values of (α1, α2, γ) have a differential effect on the proportion of elections with
only positive campaigning, which helps in calibrating the parameters.
Finally, consider parameters k, βc, and ψs. These parameters all govern the spread in the
distribution of initial support. As discussed in the empirical model section, a lower value
of k corresponds to a higher variance in initial support, which generates wider variation
in campaigning choices. Holding fixed incumbency status, one can think of drawing initial
support from a mixture distribution, where k governs the variance of all the underlying
distributions, ψs governs the relative means of the underlying distributions, and βc governs
the probability of drawing from each distribution.
I argue that these parameters affect the variation of initial support, and therefore cam-
paigning strategies, in different ways. First note that, given parameters, the draw for initial
support is a mixture of four Dirichlet distributions. In particular, denoting the proba-
bility of being skilled as β˜c =
eβc
1+eβc
∈ [0, 1], and ignoring ψdem and ψinc for notational
simplicity:
• With probability β˜2c , initial support is drawn from Dir(k(r1(Ze) + ψs), k(r2(Ze) +
ψs), k(R(Ze)− 2ψs));
• W.p. β˜c(1− β˜c), initial support is drawn from Dir(kr1(Ze), k(r2(Ze) +ψs), k(R(Ze)−
ψs));
• W.p. β˜c(1− β˜c), initial support is drawn from Dir(k(r1(Ze) +ψs), kr2(Ze), k(R(Ze)−
ψs));
• W.p. (1− β˜c)2, initial support is drawn from Dir(kr1(Ze), kr2(Ze), kR(Ze)).
Given parameters (k, β˜c, ψs), note that the mean of r1 under the mixture distribution is
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given by:
β˜c(r1(Ze) + ψs) + (1− β˜c)r1(Ze) = r1(Ze) + β˜cψs, (24)
and the variance of r1 is given by:
β˜c
(
(r1(Ze) + ψs)(1− r1(Ze)− ψs)
k + 1
)
+(1− β˜c)
(
r1(Ze)(1− r1(Ze))
k + 1
)
+ β˜c(1− β˜c)ψ2s . (25)
To show that k, β˜c, and ψs affect the distribution in different ways, I show that for ψs 6= 0,
any two different sets of parameters (k, β˜c, ψs) and (k
′, β˜′c, ψ′s) generate a different distribu-
tion for initial support.65 I prove this by contradiction. Consider two different parameter
values and let β˜′c = aβ˜c. For the mean to be the same under both distributions, it must
be that ψ′s =
ψs
a , as follows from (24). Additionally, let the variance under parameters
(k, β˜c, ψs) as V1 (given in (25)), and the variance under the alternative parameters be given
by V ′1 , or:
aβ˜c
(
(r1(Ze) +
ψs
a )(1− r1(Ze)− ψsa )
k′ + 1
)
+ (1−aβ˜c)
(
r1(Ze)(1− r1(Ze))
k′ + 1
)
+aβ˜c(1−aβ˜c)ψ
2
s
a2
,
which is non-linear in both a and k. In order for V1 = V
′
1 , I can rearrange and solve for k
′,
which yields:
k′ =
aβ˜c(r1(Ze) +
ψs
a )(1− r1(Ze)− ψsa ) + (1− aβ˜c)r1(Ze)(1− r1(Ze))
V1 − aβ˜c(1− aβ˜c)ψ2sa2
− 1. (26)
Thus, it must be that if two different parameter vectors have the same distribution of initial
support, with β˜′c = aβ˜c, then it is a necessary condition that ψ′s =
ψs
a , and k
′ must satisfy
(26).
However, the joint density of initial support under parameters (k, β˜c, ψs) can be written
65I proceed assuming ψs > 0, since if ψs = 0, then the value of β˜s is irrelevant as being skilled would not
affect anything.
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as:
g(r1, r2, R;k, β˜c, ψs) =
1∑
i,j=0
β˜i+jc (1− β˜c)2−i−j
(
r
k(r1(Ze)+ψsi)
1 r
k(r2(Ze)+ψsj)
2 R
k(R(Ze)−ψs(i+j))
)
× 1
B(k(r1(Ze) + ψsi), k(r2(Ze) + ψsj), k(1− r1(Ze)− r2(Ze)− ψs(i+ j))) .
where B(a, b, c) is the beta function, and with 0 < r1 + r2 < 1 and R = 1 − r1 − r2.
Alternatively, under (k′, β˜′c, ψ′s) as specified above, the density is given by:
g(r1, r2, R;k
′, β˜′c, ψ
′
s) =
1∑
i,j=0
(aβ˜c)
i+j(1− aβ˜c)2−i−j×(
r
k′(r1(Ze)+ψsa i)
1 r
k′(r2(Ze)+ψsa j)
2 R
k′(R(Ze)−ψsa (i+j))
)
×
1
B(k′(r1(Ze) + ψsa i), k
′(r2(Ze) + ψsa j), k
′(1− r1(Ze)− r2(Ze)− ψsa (i+ j)))
.
Clearly, this is different from the density under the original parameters. This contradicts
the supposition that the mixture distribution was identical under both sets of parameters.
Therefore, changes in these parameters will affect the distributions of initial support, and
therefore campaigning strategies, differentially.
Presented in Table 27 are the calibrated parameters. I note that the calibrated model
implies essentially no “boomerang” effect from negative campaigning on a candidate’s own
supporters. I also let ψ̂inc = 0.022, which corresponds approximately to a 4.4% advantage
in initial support.66 Additionally, the shifter ψ̂inc = 0.1157 indicates an 11.6% increase
in initial support, conditional on being skilled. The probability of being skilled, which
is governed by βc, is approximately 97%. Finally, the calibrated value of ψ̂dem = 0.045
implies that the estimates for Democratic support based solely on demographics, r1(Ze),
are persistently low. Incidentally, the mean of r1(Ze)+ψ̂dem across all elections in the sample
is 0.1987, which is approximately equal to the mean of r2(Ze), given by 0.1958.
66This is because, by assumption, if candidate i is an incumbent and candidate j is the challenger, then
mean initial support for candidate i increases by ψ̂inc and for candidate j decreases by ψ̂inc.
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Table 27
Calibrated Parameter
Parameter Value
γ 1.0297
α1 0.0001
α2 0.5922
βc 3.1837
ψs 0.1157
ψinc 0.0215
ψdem 0.0446
k 162.65
To investigate the fit of the calibrated model, Table 28 shows the average proportion of
negative campaigning in the data as compared to simulations, while Figure 18 shows the
distributions of negativity. The top two graphs are for Democrats and the bottom two are
for Republicans, while within each pair the top presents the distribution in the data and the
bottom presents the simulated distribution. Overall, the model captures several important
features of the data, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In the data, overall a bit more
than half (56.7%) of advertisements are negative, with Democrats performing more negative
campaigning than Republicans, by about 3.8 percentage points. The model captures these
features as well, only slightly predicting both overall negativity and negativity by party
by approximately 4 percentage points. In addition, the data shows that challengers tend
to go significantly more negative than incumbents by a margin of 71.5% to 38.8%. The
model overpredicts the negativity of incumbents by only 3.7 percentage points, but more
significantly underpredicts the negativity of challengers, by 8.3%. Still, the model does
broadly capture the significant differences between the two groups. Finally, while the model
predicts candidates in open seat elections will campaign negatively about 51.1% of the time,
in the data they do so about 65.2% of the time.
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Figure 18
Histograms of Negative Campaigning Proportions, True vs. Simulated
100
Table 28
Mean Negativity, Data vs. Simulated
Data Simulated
Overall 0.567 0.520
Democrats 0.586 0.536
Republicans 0.548 0.505
Incumbents 0.388 0.425
Challengers 0.715 0.632
Open Seats 0.652 0.511
Note: As % of Total Budget
2.7 Results
Having shown the model can capture the salient features regarding campaign strategies,
I move to analyzing the model’s implications for the effectiveness of campaign strategies
and spending. To interpret the remaining coefficients, I perform several exercises. As a
first measure of the overall effectiveness of money, consider an open-seat election in which
both candidates have the mean value of rei and budgets Bi. In the sample, this implies
(conditional on being skilled) values of re1 = 0.3144, r
e
2 = 0.3114, B1 = $2.393 million, and
B2 = $2.338 million. I then compute the change in expected vote share resulting from a 10%
increase in one candidate’s budgets, which corresponds to about $240,000 dollars. Note that
for this exercise, I recompute the equilibrium under the new budgets. This exercise implies
that, for both Democrats and Republicans, the increase in the expected vote differential in
response to the increase is approximately 0.4 percentage points. This order of magnitude
is consistent with Levitt (1994), which estimates that, in 1990 U.S. elections, a $100,000
increase in spending by a candidate increases his vote share by less than 0.2 percentage
points for incumbents, and by between 0.19 and 0.42 percentage points for challengers.
Converting $100,000 in 1990 to 2000 dollars, the model implies that such an increase in
spending increases the expected vote differential by about 0.22 percentage points in an
open seat elections. Unlike Levitt (1994), I find very little difference in ad effectiveness
if I vary incumbency status, though at this point I hold both initial support and budgets
fixed and approximately equal. Differences in marginal effectiveness across incumbents and
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challengers may be largely explained by systematic differences in initial support, average
budget sizes, and diminishing returns of campaign spending, which I explore below.
To analyze the model in an alternative fashion, I note that Congressional districts based on
the 2000 Census contain on average 521,759 voting age individuals.67 Under the calibrated
parameter, a budget increase of $1 per voting age individual (approximately $521,759)
implies an increase in expected vote difference of about 0.87 percentage points in a rep-
resentative election. This is in line, albeit a bit smaller, than estimates from Palda and
Palda (1998), which find using French data that “incumbent candidates can at best expect
to win 1.01% of the popular vote for each extra Franc they spend per registered voter in
their district.”68
In order to more richly characterize the implications of the model, I also investigate the
overall effectiveness of spending for different combinations of initial support, incumbency,
and budgets. Table 29 shows results when candidate 1 is an incumbent, while Table 30
shows results for an open seat election. The tables are constructed as follows. Fixing
re1 + ψ̂inc and r
e
2 − ψ̂inc (which vary by column), I compute the expected vote share if
there was no spending, which is given by re1 − re2 + 2ψ̂inc. Then, given B1 and B2 (which
vary by row), I compute the equilibrium of the campaign game and the resulting expected
vote difference. The numbers in the tables then reflect the pre-spending expected vote
difference minus the post-spending expected vote difference – that is, a negative number
indicates that, after spending, candidate 2 is relatively better off. I note that Bi low is
selected to be approximately the 25th percentile of all budgets, Bi mid is approximately the
median budget, and Bi high is the 75th percentile, while the initial supports are analogously
defined. Note also that I keep things perfectly symmetric between the two sides, except for
incumbency, to control for party-specific factors.
67This estimate comes from the 2008 ACS 3 year estimates of total population over 18 by Congressional
district. Note that I do not have data on voter registration data by district, so this is an upper bound.
68Palda and Palda (1998) used data from 1993 French elections. Converting a 1993 French Franc to 2000
U.S. dollars implies that one French Franc from 1993 is worth about $0.22 in 2000 U.S. dollars. Under the
calibrated model, an increase of $0.22 per voting age individual in spending increases the expected vote
difference (in the representative election) by approximately 0.2 percentage points.
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Table 29
Change In Expected Vote Differential For Candidate 1, From No Spending
to Equilibrium with (B1, B2) - 1 is Incumbent
re1 low/r
e
2 high r
e
1 mid/r
e
2 mid r
e
1 high/r
e
2 low
B1 low, B2 high -2.497 -2.555 -2.761
B1 mid, B2 mid 0.001 -0.008 -0.131
B1 high, B2 low 2.528 2.497 2.452
Note: Bi low is 0.07, Bi mid is 0.14, Bi high is 0.21. r
e
i low is 0.256, r
e
i mid is 0.291, r
e
i high is 0.326,
plus/minus ψ̂inc = 0.0215 for candidates 1/2. Results in percentage points.
Table 30
Change In Expected Vote Differential For Candidate 1, From No Spending
to Equilibrium with (B1, B2) - Open Seat Election
re1 low/r
e
2 high r
e
1 mid/r
e
2 mid r
e
1 high/r
e
2 low
B1 low, B2 high -2.495 -2.501 -2.619
B1 mid, B2 mid 0.038 0 -0.038
B1 high, B2 low 2.619 2.501 2.495
Note: Bi low is 0.07, Bi mid is 0.14, Bi high is 0.21. r
e
i low is 0.256, r
e
i mid is 0.291, r
e
i high is 0.326.
Results in percentage points.
Table 29 illustrates several important features of the model’s implications for campaign
spending effectiveness.69 First, fixing a given row, note that the percentage change decreases
as re1 increases and r
e
2 decreases. This indicates that when candidate 1 is behind, his
spending is relatively more productive, consistent with previous evidence (see Levitt (1994)
and Palda and Palda (1998)). This is largely driven by the fact that, when one’s opponent
has a high level of initial support, negative campaigning is particularly effective. This is
illustrated most clearly when B1 mid, B2 mid and r
e
1 high, r
e
2 low. Here, even though both
candidates have identical budgets, candidate 2 benefits relatively more from his spending,
albeit a minor amount of 0.131 percentage points. More generally, table also reflects the
relative ineffectiveness of spending. For instance, even when the incumbent has a high
budget and the challenger has a low budget – which corresponds to a $1.4 million advantage
– in net, the incumbent’s spending increases his expected margin by only 2.5%. The same
dollar advantage is only slightly more effective for the challenger, yielding an increase of
2.8% for the challenger.
69Table 30 shows the same figures, except for an open seat election, with similar implications.
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To investigate the relative effectiveness of positive versus negative campaigning, I consider
how a large increase in either all positive or all negative campaigning affects the expected
vote share. In particular, for the same combinations of budgets and initial support as above,
I compute the equilibrium. Then, I compute the expected vote difference due to a sizable
increase ($237,000, or 10% of the average budget in the sample) in exclusively positive or
exclusively negative campaigning for one candidate, without allowing for a response from
the opponent.
Table 31
Change in Expected Vote Differential for Candidate 1, from $237,000
Increase in B1 - 1 is Incumbent
re1 low/r
e
2 high r
e
1 mid/r
e
2 mid r
e
1 high/r
e
2 low
All Pos. All Neg. All Pos. All Neg. All Pos. All Neg.
B1 low, B2 high 0.4432 0.4231 0.4442 0.3744 0.4445 0.3257
B1 mid, B2 mid 0.4200 0.4214 0.4174 0.3744 0.4166 0.3257
B1 high, B2 low 0.4094 0.4109 0.3919 0.3744 0.3904 0.3257
Note: Bi low is 0.07, Bi mid is 0.14, Bi high is 0.21. r
e
i low is 0.256, r
e
i mid is 0.291, r
e
i high is 0.326, plus/minus ψ̂inc = 0.0215
for candidates 1/2. Results in percentage points
Table 32
Change in Expected Vote Differential for Candidate 1, from $237,000
Increase in B1 - Open Seat Election
re1 low/r
e
2 high r
e
1 mid/r
e
2 mid r
e
1 high/r
e
2 low
All Pos. All Neg. All Pos. All Neg. All Pos. All Neg.
B1 low, B2 high 0.4481 0.4496 0.4435 0.4042 0.4444 0.3555
B1 mid, B2 mid 0.4374 0.4390 0.4175 0.4042 0.4172 0.3555
B1 high, B2 low 0.4265 0.4281 0.3984 0.3998 0.3917 0.3555
Note: Bi low is 0.07, Bi mid is 0.14, Bi high is 0.21. r
e
i low is 0.256, r
e
i mid is 0.291, r
e
i high is 0.326.
Table 33
Change in Expected Vote Differential for Candidate 1, from $237,000
Increase in B1 - 1 is Incumbent, fixed re2
re1 low/r
e
2 mid r
e
1 mid/r
e
2 mid r
e
1 high/r
e
2 mid
All Pos. All Neg. All Pos. All Neg. All Pos. All Neg.
B1 low, B2 high 0.4803 0.3744 0.4442 0.3744 0.4070 0.3744
B1 mid, B2 mid 0.4524 0.3744 0.4174 0.3744 0.3808 0.3744
B1 high, B2 low 0.4247 0.3744 0.3919 0.3744 0.3667 0.3681
Note: Bi low is 0.07, Bi mid is 0.14, Bi high is 0.21. r
e
i low is 0.256, r
e
i mid is 0.291, r
e
i high is 0.326, plus/minus ψ̂inc = 0.0215
for candidates 1/2. Results in percentage points.
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Table 31 shows the results of this exercise. Note that Table 32 shows the same figures for
an open seat elections, with similar implications. These results illustrate some important
points. First, note that the overall vote share increases are relatively small, between 0.33
and 0.44 percentage points. This reinforces the notion that campaign spending is relatively
ineffective at increasing vote shares. Second, note that, for fixed budget levels, the effective-
ness of negative campaigning decreases noticeably as re2 decreases, while the effectiveness
of positive campaigning remains relatively constant.70 This is largely due to the fact that,
for Table 31, I simultaneously change the initial supports for both candidates so as to keep
the measure of swing voters, R
e
, constant. I can also increase re1 while keeping r
e
2 fixed,
which necessarily decreases the measure of swing voters. In Table 33, I show results to
illustrate this. In this case, as re1 increases, and thus R decreases, the effectiveness of posi-
tive campaigning decreases, while for negative campaigning it remains essentially constant.
This illustrates that the level of re1 is not the key factor for the relative ad effectiveness
for candidate 1, but rather the levels of re2 and R
e
. This is particularly true since, in the
calibrated model, the value of the “boomerang” effect is minor, implying that the level of
own initial support is not directly important for the optimal strategy.
Finally, holding fixed a level of initial support, as B1 increases (and B2 decreases), I see
a decline in the relative effectiveness of additional campaign spending.71 While it is more
noticeable for positive campaigning (decreasing by about 0.05 percentage points from B1 =
$700, 000 to B1 = $2.1 million), it is still apparent in negative campaigning. This is due to
diminishing returns from campaign spending that, while not strong, are present.
2.8 Conclusion
The effect of money on election outcomes is a widely discussed topic in economics and
political science. A key factor that determines the effectiveness of money and its differential
70I note that even for negative campaigning, the degree to which ad effectiveness changes as re2 changes is
small, with changes of at most 0.1 percentage points.
71I also performed this exercise holding fixed B2 as B1 changes, and the result is essentially identical.
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impact across candidates is campaign negativity, which is often overlooked by other studies.
In particular, given that different candidate-types (e.g. incumbents versus challengers) use
campaign funds in systematically different ways, recovering the true impact of money on
election outcomes requires an understanding how effective alternative strategies are. To
this end, I develop a structural model featuring a game between candidates who choose a
level of negativity. Positive and negative campaigning affect different groups of voters in
different ways: positivity is persuasive to swing voters deciding for whom to vote, whereas
negativity affects polarized voters’ decision of whether or not to turnout. Using data on
levels of negativity from television advertising, candidate budgets, and other candidate-
and district-specific observables, I calibrate the model, which provides implications for the
overall and relative effectiveness of campaign strategies.
The calibrated model suggests that campaign spending is mostly ineffective at increasing
vote shares. For the average election, which has budgets of about $2.4 million, a 10%
increase in one candidate’s budget increases his expected vote differential by about 0.4
percentage points. This is roughly in line with results from Levitt (1994), among others.
In alternative terms, in an election where both candidates have similar levels of initial
support, if one candidate has a $2.1 million budget while the other $700,000, this yields a
2.5 percentage point improvement in the expected vote differential for the first candidate.
I employ other calculations to find that, albeit small, the trailing candidates benefit from
extra funds more than the leading ones. I also find that negative campaigning is relatively
effective for candidates who face an opponent with a high level of initial support, while
positive campaigning is relatively effective for candidates in elections where neither side has
a particularly high initial support. Finally, the model implies slightly decreasing returns to
spending. This may, in part, explain why the previous literature tends to find challenger
spending is relatively more effective than incumbent spending, as incumbents typically have
large budget advantages.
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2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. 1. Suppose MBin(x1, x2) > 0. Then definition 18 implies
that
rjα2
riα1
> exp{(α2 − α1)(xi − xj)}. Now note that
∂MBin(xj)
∂xi
= rjα
2
2exp{−α1xj − α2xi} − riα21exp{−α1xi − α2xj}
which is negative if and only if
α2
α1
rjα2
riα1
exp{(α2 − α1)(xi − xj)} > rjα2
riα1
exp{(α2 −
α1)(xi − xj)} > 0. But the first inequlity is satisfied due to the modeling assumption
α2 > α1. The second inequality is obtained by the previous fact stated. Hence the
statement is correct.
2. This is trivial since one can immediately see that
∂MBip(xi)
∂xi
> 0 once the derivative
is taken:
∂MBip(xi)
∂xi
=
2R
γK4
[
(1− 1/γ)(1 +Bi − xi)1/γ−2(1 +Bj − xj)1/γK2
+2K/γ(1 +Bi − xi)2/γ−2(1 +Bj − xj)1/γ
]
where K = (1 +Bi − xi)1/γ + (1 +Bj − xj)1/γ .
3. Note that
∂MBin(xj)
∂xj
= riα1α2exp{−α1xj − α2xi} − rjα1α2exp{−α1xi − α2xj}
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Hence
∂MBin(xj)
∂xj

< 0 if
rj
ri
> exp{(α2 − α1)(xi − xj)}
= 0 if
rj
ri
= exp{(α2 − α1)(xi − xj)}
> 0 if
rj
ri
< exp{(α2 − α1)(xi − xj)}
(27)
The statement follows directly. To see it, suppose
∂MBin(xj)
∂xj
< 0, that is
rj
ri
>
exp{(α2 − α1)(xi − xj)}. Taking the inverse of both sides immediately implies ri
rj
<
exp{(α2−α1)(xj−xi)} which means ∂MB
j
n(xi)
∂xi
> 0. All other directions are similar.
4. Taking the appropriate derivatives, one can show that
sgn
(
∂MBip(x1, x2)
∂xj
)
= sgn
(
−1/γ(1 +Bj − xj)1/γ−1(1 +Bi − xi)1/γ−1K2
+1/γ2K(1 +Bj − xj)2/γ−1(1 +Bi − xi)1/γ−1
)
= sgn (Bj − xj − (Bi − xi))
where K is as defined above. The result follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma 3. Take x˜j ∈ [0, Bj ]. First, notice that if a corner {0, Bi} is a best re-
sponse, it is the unique one. To see this, note that 0 ∈ BRi(x˜j) if MBin(0, x˜j) < MBip(0, x˜j).
But since the marginal benefit of positive ads is increasing in x1 and that of negative ads is
decreasing in x1, MB
i
n(xi, x˜j) < MB
i
p(xi, x˜j) for all xi, which implies 0 is the unique best
response. The same idea in the opposite direction applies for Bi.
On the other hand, if xi ∈ (0, Bi) (an interior action) is in the best response, it is the
unique one. To see this note that MBip(x1, x2) > 0 ∀ xk ∈ [0, Bk], k ∈ {1, 2}. Since for
any interior best response it must be that MBin(xi, x˜j) = MB
i
p(xi, x˜j) > 0. Recall that
when MBin(x1, x2) > 0, then
∂MBin(xj)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
(x1,x2)
< 0. Also since
∂MBip
∂xi
> 0, the LHS is
decreasing in xi whereas the LHS is increasing. Hence there can be only one xi that satisfies
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the condition MBin(xi, x˜j) = MB
i
p(xi, x˜j).
Therefore, the best response is a function and is given by
BRi(xj) =

x˜i if MB
i
n(x˜i, xj) = MB
i
p(x˜i, xj)
0 if MBin(0, xj) ≤MBip(0, xj)
Bi if MB
i
n(Bi, xj) ≥MBip(Bi, xj)
(28)
Functions MBik(xi, xj), k ∈ {p, n} are continuous in both xi and xj . Moreover, operations
= and > preserve continuity. Hence, BRi must be continuous.
Proof of Theorem 1. Define the function f : [0, Bi] → [0, Bi], f(x) = BR1(BR2(x)).
Obviously, a strategy profile (x∗1, BR2(x∗1)) is an equilibrium if and only if f(x∗1) = x∗1.
By Lemma 3, both BR1 and BR2 are continuous, which implies that f is also continuous.
Since it also maps a compact set to itself, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there exists
x∗ ∈ [0, B1] such that f(x∗) = x∗. Hence, (x∗, BR2(x∗)) is an equilibrium. This completes
the proof.
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